Hearing Transcripts from United States v. SFWMD, et al.,

Case No. 88-1886-CIV-HOEVELER


 

     STYLE:      US vs. SFWMD
     CASE:        88-1886-CIV-WMH
     JUDGE:     WILLIAM M.HOEVELER
     DATE:        December 11, 1989

     NAVIGATION:
                         Appearances
                         Proceeding
                         Page:   20  40 60
                         Certificate (page 73)


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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION

 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT
DISTRICT; JOHN R. WODRASKA,
Executive Director, South
Florida Water Management
District; FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
and DALE TWACHTMANN, Secretary,
Florida Department of
Environmental Regulation,

Defendants,

and

WESTERN PALM BEACH COUNTY
FARM BUREAU, INC.; FLORIDA
FRUIT AND VEGETABLE ASSOCIATION;
FLORIDA SUGAN CANE LEAGUE, INC.;
ROTH FARMS, INC.; K.W.B. FARMS
and BEARDSLEY FARMS, INC.,

Defendants-Intervernors

__________________________________________

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Case No
88-1886-CIV-WMH

          MIAMI, FLORIDA
          December 11, 1989
 

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING PROCEEDINGS
IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER
BEFORE THE HONORABLE WILLIAM M.
HOEVELER, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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APPEARANCES:

SUZAN HILL PONZOLI, ESQ.
Assistant U.S. Attorney
RICHARD HARRISON, ESQ
Assistant U.S. Attorney
For the Plaintiff
Miami, Florida



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STANLEY J. NIEGO, ESQ.
South Florida Water Management
District, West Palm Beach, Florida

THOMAS ANKERSEN, ESQ.
For the City of Belle Glade


ROBERT G. GOUGH, ESQ
Assistant General Counsel
State of Florida
Department of Enviornmental Regulation
2600 Blair Stone Road
Tallahassee, Florida


THOMAS W. REESE, ESQ
123 Eighth Street North
St. Petersburg, Florida
For the Florida Keys Citizens Coalition



3


SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER
& FLOM
1440 New York Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
BY:  JAMES A. ROGERS., ESQ
& JERRY JACKSON, ESQ
For Defendants South Florida Water
Management District & John Wodraska

PEEPLES, EARL & BLANK, P. A.
One Biscayne Tower
Miami, Florida
BY:  WILLIAM L. EARL, ESQ.
        L.G. PEEPLES, ESQ
For the Agricultural Intervenors


DAVID CROWLEY, ESQ
DANIEL H. CROWLEY, ESQ.
Assistant General Counsel
State of Florida Department of
Environmental Regulation


ROBERT DREHER, ESQ.
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund
1531 P Street, N. W.
Washington, D C.


JAMES T. B. TRIPP, ESQ.
Environmental Defense Fund
257 Park Avenue South
New York, New York


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THE COURT: Sit down, please, folks. Good

afternoon. We are here on United States versus South

Florida Water Management District and others, and we are

here on motions.

MR. ROGERS: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. ROGERS:  Jim Rogers for the District.

THE COURT:  Mr. Rogers.

MR. ROGERS: I will try to be brief.

THE COURT: Take your time.

MR. ROGERS: Your Honor asked a question – I

think it was at the last hearing or, rather, stated what the

case was about .

You said that this was a case about violating the

law, are we violating state law, and simplified it. I want

to try to answer that question and I am going to take a two

minute detour to get there.

I am going to try to put this in perspective

because I think it is important to talk about the process we

are in. These charts here will be used to demonstrate the

point.

We’ve referred on and off to how complicated this

case is and I will tell you as an environmental lawyer who

alleges some expertise this has set my head spinning. I’ve

never seen anything like it.

 

 


5

I’ve sat through hours and hours and days and days

of hearings with the District and all their interest groups

talking about hydro periods which are how long the water is

on the land and how along it’s not; worrying about birds who

need to have snails at a certain height during part of the

year so they can eat; at the same time we need water in

certain cities and there is a delicate balance between

serving both goals. It is like one big tube of toothpaste.

Every time the District tries to deal with one end

there is something that comes out the other end.

It is very delicate interwoven balance between. It’s an

extremely sensitive environmental system and it is being

addressed by some very sophisticated scientists in the

District and people on the outside who are helping the

District.

We are trying to figure out what level of nutrient

enrichment is safe, if any. What amount of phosphorous, to

some extent nitrogen, is getting into these water

conservation areas which the old Everglades primitive

environmental system – they are on that chart over there

and I will point to them in a minute – we are not talking

just about Everglades Park.

We are talking about the Loxahatchee; we are

talking about all the remaining primitive environmental

systems, the natural systems. How much phosphorous can

 

 


6

these systems take? That is probably the issue, the

foremost issue which the District is examining, nutrient

enrichment. Is there a no-action level? Can we measure it

in terms of daily maxima coming out of these outfalls and

these structures or should we be looking at an ambient level

or both?

There are statistical problems of enormous

complexity here just in terms of how you communicate in his

area, much less setting the final standard.

We are trying to deal with feasibility of the

proposed options. We are talking about pumping systems here

where you cannot just slap on a carbon filtration system

like you can on a lot of industries and say that you are

treating the water.

There is just too much water going through large

structures so we have to deal with other really, fairly

unusual options for handling the problem.

If I could, Your Honor, I would like to show you on

this map. This is one of the proposals for handling the

problem.

This is Lake Okeechobee up here. These tracts in

here are what is called the Everglades agricultural area and

these areas that are set off in the checkmarks and dash

lines and colors are various acreages privately owned and

to some extent more often publicly owned which are proposed

 

 


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to be set aside as settling basins since phosphorous will

actually settle out sometimes with the assistance of

vegetation specifically planned for that purpose, so that

when the water gets to the major structures here, which are

into these environmental sensitive areas they will be clean,

40 thousand acres, an unprecedented public project, very,

very controversial.

The agricultural interests are, to put it mildly,

upset . They say that you are taking valuable land out of

production; you are setting a very bad precedent. They’ve

mounted a full-scale campaign against this idea.

They are carrying on document production with us

quite apart from this lawsuit. Mr. Earl and his firm, under

the state laws, have come in and they are looking at all the

documents we have.

We have produced ninety banker boxes so far for

them. On the other side I think it is fair to say that

there is criticism of this proposal by environmental groups

and some people in state government to the effect that why

are we using state-owned lands to solve a private pollution

problem.

It is a very lively debate and it takes place –I

am not sure you can see, but the basic purpose is to show

that there are numerous meetings being held throughout the

year.

 

 


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There are public meetings. There are workshops;

there are governor, board meetings. There are two different

advisory committees that are helping with this and who will

debate on how to save the Everglades system.

By the way, Your Honor, the Government is

represented on the Advisory Committee, the Corps of

Engineers, Fish and Wildlife Service. The point is that

there is a very substantial effort.

This concern over the geographic area, which is the

subject of the suit, is consuming the District and the Board

and their time.

The workshops, the various analyses, listening to

outside experts traveling around this area to listen to the

farmers, listening to environmental groups is not just

number one on the their agenda.

It is almost an all consuming venture and they are

taking an enormous amount of their own personal time to try

to resolve this problem. This is the "SWIM" process; you

have heard of this mentioned and I think Your Honor said

"Well, that’s a state process. Why am I concerned with

that?"

I am trying to show you how it really does come

back and it answers your question of –isn’t this case

about violating state law? Isn’t that really what the issue

is about? I think it is and I will try to show how this all

 

 


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ties together.

The SWIM ACT is a 1987 specific legislative effort

that tells the South Florida Water Management District to

take on this tough issue, not only the Everglades but Lake

Okeechobee and other natural systems in their jurisdiction.

It tells them to come up with proposals that

address the many people who are using the water to look at

water quality, water quantity, and all the various factors

that certainly will be before Your Honor if we try this

case, the equitable factors.

We are not talking "pie in the sky". We are not

talking hypothetical programs. We are not talking about

what the State may do, the District may do. We have an

ongoing very major regulatory program. It will lead to

stringent controls.

It will lead to palpable regulation of the

pollution that is entering in these sensitive systems. This

is not some speculative argument I am making. We can refer

you to volume after volume of material and, indeed, the

agricultural people, if you recall, Your Honor, I think it

was in the last argument inserted in the record, as if you

didn’t need more documents in this case, inserted in the

record volumes of the August ’89 which is the second to last

version of this SWIM proposal which goes into all the

glorious detail about all the problems we’ve been dealing

 

 


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with.

So the point is that there will be soon, and I

think the last dates we are looking at for final type action

is the middle of next year, early next year, there will be a

very forthright, tangible proposal to address the very

contamination that the Government is worried about in this

case; and it will be voted on up or down.

It will be public. The whole process is public.

Indeed, when I give legal advice to my client it’s in the

public, which is somewhat unusual.

If people are unhappy about it, they can appeal and

that includes the Federal Government. We are certain to get

appeals from a variety of sources. This won’t be over when

the Board acts, but the Government can complain about the

result in this case, and as far as we read the law, they can

come right back before Your Honor and say, "This doesn’t do

it. This isn’t good enough."

They can do that because there will be a final

agency action; they can use state law, state administrative

procedures, the substantive body of law.

They can use Section 1345 as a plaintiff to come

right back in Federal Court and be presented with this and

you will have a record. You will have testimony. You will

have a complete background on which to rule if, indeed, it

is necessary to rule at that time.

 

 


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The beauty of the SWIM process is that we have all

interested parties before the Management District.

We don’t have agricultural interests coming in and

saying, "Well, we want to participate in the lawsuit but we

do not want to bind our members." That doesn’t work with

us. They are in essence involuntary class defendants in

this case.

They are the regulated parties. They have had

proper notice and Mr. Earl and his firm are participating in

every conceivable way in this. They have a court reporter,

for example, at every one of our sessions to take down word

for word what is said.

They know they are bound by the result. They have

had proper notice and, indeed, we have – everyone who has

to be bound for meaningful result is in the SWIM process.

Now, I said I would tie this back to Your Honor’s

question. The state statute under which this legislation

really --- the center piece of the state statute on which

this legislation is based says to the District in no

uncertain terms, "You shall guarantee, when you are done

with this process, that there will be no violation of state

water quality standards; that there will be no interference

with indigenous vegetation, aquatic organisms," the very

thing which the Government in their papers is talking about.

So that is our mandate. We have to guarantee it

 

 


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and that is the standard against which we are going to be

judged.

This process is on a fast track. We will have a

result, we hope, well, certainly by next year at this time,

but we hope even sooner than that.

I want to say this with all respect; I don’t want

to sound facetious. This process will go on, Your Honor, no

matter what happens in this court because they are mandated

to do it, you know, unless Your Honor somehow issues an

injunction.

This is what we are under obligation to do. It

will have a result. Our frustration is the documents and

all the discovery fights we are having and the prospect of

having a trial in this court on these very same issues,

complete duplicitous legal proceedings. That’s our

frustration, what we see ahead of us.

So let me try to distill this down. We are saying

that the doctrines of abstention, primary jurisdiction,

exhaustion of sate remedies, all come into play in this

case.

We are saying that when you have a state agency –

for purposes of the argument let’s call them a state

agency, charged specifically by the legislature to carry out

this mandate with factors they have to consider which are,

indeed, the factors which are set forth in the

 

 


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plaintiff’s papers, with all the parties that are necessary

before that body, proceeding with all deliberate speed and

in good faith, and I will add there is no allegation in any

of the papers that there is anything illusory about the way

the District is proceeding – we say that the Federal Court

should stay its hand and let this process go forward.

This is how the taxpayers, the voters of the State

of Florida chose to resolve this very complex, very

difficult social issue, to let the professionals who are

paid for this day in, day out tackle this problem in the

first instance.

If there still is a problem when it is all over, as

I said, the U.S. Government can proceed again in this court.

I will say we hope and we have been I think in

recent days pleasantly surprised – we hope that the Federal

Government and all its agencies will participate, the Fish &

Wildlife Service, the Corps of Engineers, and the Park

Service; and we have placed representatives of those people

on our Advisory Commission so the can have a direct role in

this.

Finally, let me say that I find it troubling that

in response to one of our arguments in this case, where, if

you recall early on, we said, "Why isn’t the Federal

Government using any federal cause of action? Why is there

no Federal statute alleged anywhere n this complaint? Why

 

 


14

 

aren’t they using the Clean water Act?" That’s this 100

page document that the U.S. Attorney usually relies on.

Well, the answer comes back, "Well, Congress made a

specific decision to defer this type of pollution to the

states," and we agree with that.

But I think we have to follow that argument to its

logical conclusion. This is how the State of Florida is

dealing with this problem and I think we ought to let them

try to work it out according to that set plan.

Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Jackson will address

certain of the specific points if that’s all right with Your

Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, certainly.

MR. JACKSON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I am

Jerry Jackson. I also represent the South Florida Water

Management District as well as its Executive Director, Mr.

Wodraska.

THE COURT: All right, sir.

MR. JACKSON: As Mr. Rogers point out, there are

no federal statutory claims in this case. Counts one and

two are both based solely on state environmental laws and

allegations that we violated those laws.

The Florida legislature which passed those statutes

has also provided one key to the courthouse for people who

wish to enforce its state environmental laws, aside from the

 

 


15

 

State Attorney General who, of course, can enforce them but

who is not a party here and the key is the Florida

Environmental Protection Act which is at Section 403.412 of

the Florida Statutes.

However, when the legislature passed that

legislation and provided that key to people other than the

State Attorney General to enforce these statutes, they put

two conditions on being able to use that mechanism to get

into court.

One is that they limit it to citizens of the state

and the other is that the plaintiff must provide 30 days

advance notice to the agency that should be enforcing this

statute before they can come into court.

The United States, of course, is not a citizen of

the State of Florida, has never argued that it is and could

not in any conceivable way be considered to be a citizen of

an inferior sovereign of the state and the United States has

never filed this 30 day notice and has never argued that

they have filed such a notice

Instead, their arguments in response to our motion

to dismiss have been that the plain meaning of the statute

that I just cited, the Environmental Protection Act, should

be disregarded; and the suit is over 30 days old anyway so

what difference does it make whether we provided 30 days

notice before we sued?

 

 


16

 

However, in November of this year the United States

Supreme court issued a ruling construing a similar type of

notice requirement for suits by citizens of the United

States to enforce Federal environmental statutes and that

was the case called Hallstrom versus Tillamook County, and

we have provided the court with a copy of the slip opinion

in that case on November 16th. We filed that as a notice of

recent authority.

Now these statutes are similar to the Florida

Environmental Protection Act because in many federal

environmental laws there is something called the citizens

suit provision that works in a similar fashion that says

that someone besides the United Sates Attorney or the

Attorney General of the United States can bring and action to

enforce a federal environmental statute but only if they

meet certain conditions precedent, one of which is to file

notice 60 days in advance of the lawsuit with the State

Environmental Enforcement Agency.

Now, in this case the plaintiffs didn’t do that.

They did file a notice with the violator but they neglected

to file a notice with the State Enforcement Agency.

When this was raised – this issue was raised

midway in the litigation – they then filed the notice,

tried to cure it by filing it during the lawsuit.

The case proceeded to trial. The court ruled in

 

 


17

 

favor of the plaintiffs. However, when it was appealed to

the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment,

ordered the case dismissed because the plaintiffs did not

file the 60 day notice.

The Supreme Court said in language that we think is

applicable here as well because we are dealing with the same

kind of statute – "When the legislature creates a cause of

action expanding the class of people that can enforce laws

say beyond the U.S. Attorney and the Attorney General and

when they put explicit conditions precedence into that

notice, into that provision allowing such suits, those

conditions precedent must he met to the letter. Otherwise

there is no jurisdiction, there is no case."

And even though the case went to trial and the

argument was that, well, this trial is being wasted, we

should preserve the result of years of litigation – even

though the plaintiffs attempted to cure during the

litigation as soon as the problem was raised, the defect was

raised to their notice, they tried to cure it by sending the

notice in, and the Supreme Court said, "It doesn’t matter.

You have got to follow this language."

The Supreme court said, "You cannot ignore the

language in the Statute,. It doesn’t matter; you cannot

argue that the complaint served as that notice when you

first filed the suit.

 


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You cannot make the argument that the environment

is too important to worry about these technicalities because

Congress consciously put these conditions precedent in that

provision."

They said, "You cannot argue. It would be a waste

of time because this litigation will go down the drain if it

is dismissed because of this lack of notice."

And they said that filing a notice in the middle of

a lawsuit does not cure the defect. These are all the same

arguments that have been made against us, against our motion

to dismiss by the United States and by the environmental

intervenors. In response to the dissimilar arguments the

Supreme court said, "The only cure is dismissal."

Now, the Florida Supreme Court has not ever

directly addressed this issue, although Florida courts have

said in the past that the conditions precedent of 403.412

are mandatory as far as filing suit to enforce the

environmental laws.

However, they haven’t directly addressed this issue

but in this case the highest appellate court is the Supreme

Court, not the Florida Supreme Court because the United

States chose to use the state law and chose to come into

Federal Court.

They have to live with that state law. They can’t

just come in and say, "We want you to enforce the parts of

 


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the state law we like and ignore the conditions precedent

set out by the legislature."

They have to live in the words of the Ninth Circuit

dealing with a similar question under the same

jurisdictional provision that the United States came into

this court on. When the United Sates comes into court and

wants to use state law, they have to live with the bitter

and the sweet. They to meet all the requirements of the

stature, not just the ones they want.

Now with respect to Counts 3 and 4, Count 3

involves a memorandum agreement with the Everglades National

Park and the Corps and the District; all three parties

signed that agreement.

The United States claims that it is and enforceable

contract that has been breached and that they have the right

to seek a remedy in this court. We have pointed out that

there is no consideration for this agreement running to us.

Therefore, it is not a contract enforceable in law.

The Government complains that we are relying on

horn-book case law, horn-book law for contracts, but it is a

very simple element of the contract that they have an

enforceable document in court, there must be consideration

running in both directions.

There must be mutual obligations and the Park

Service has not undertaken any obligation in this MOA. Only


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the District has and only the Corps has. The Corps. has

never indicated to us that they have any problem with our

compliance with that MOA.

There are probably hundreds if not thousands of

these memoranda agreements that are in existence. Many of

them are signed by federal agencies. Many of them may be

between federal agencies and sate agencies.

We suspect that the United Sates would never admit

that such an MOA, as they are commonly called, would be

enforceable against it. There are declarations of policy.

Administrative matters are taken care of, housekeeping,

division of jurisdiction, but they’re basically agreements

between the Governments on how they are going to deal with

Governmental issues.

They are not intended to be contracts that can be

used against parties signed to the agreements by other

parties.

With regard to count 4, that’s also a contract

issue. These are the two counts that don’t involve the

statutory issues, Counts 3 and 4.

Count 4 involves what is in effect a lease that was

signed by the District in 1951 with the United States

Department of the Interior.

That lease allows the Department of the Interior to

manage Water Conservation Area One. That’s the sort of

 

 


21

 

oblong area at the top of that map on the right side.

That was created as Water Conservation Area One

when the project was – Central and Southern Florida Flood

Control Project was built back or was first conceived back

in the mid 40’s.

As part of that project the District agreed to

basically lease that land to the Fish and Wildlife Service

to manage as a wildlife refuge. It’s a lease for which

there is no money. It’s basically free rent for 50 years.

Now, we agree that when the project was first

conceived by Congress and they authorized the money to build

it that they recognized that one of the incidental benefits

of the project would be that these water conservation areas

would serve as wildlife habitat and that they could be

preserved for that purpose and that they would have that

benefit. That was one of the reasons the project was built.

However, it is very clear from the documents that

reflect that Congressional decision and it is also very

clear from the lease provision itself that the protection of

wildlife habitat was an incidental side benefit of the

project, that the primary purpose of the project was and

always has been flood control and water conservation – to

the extent that wildlife preservation was to basically exist

at the same time consistent with those project purposes then

it could.

 

 


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However, the primary purpose reflected both in the

congressional documents and the lease itself, the language

that we’ve cited in our briefs makes it clear that the

primary purpose, the overriding purpose is flood control and

water conservation. The only reason that any water enters

Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge that contains nutrients

is to serve either of those two project purposes.

In order to prevail on Count 4, especially as a

matter of law, the United States has to argue that in effect

the two purposes are reversed and that actually the primary

purposes of the project as far as the refuge is concerned is

to preserve wildlife habitat and that project, other project

purposes such as flood control and water conservation must

yield when wildlife habitat is threatened.

With respect to both contract issues, the

interpretations that we ask the court to adopt of both the

contract for the lease and also the memorandum agreement

with regard to whether it has consideration, both of those

issues can be resolved by examining the two documents at

issue.

The issues are resolved by the language that’s

within the four corners of the documents. It is a matter of

law to interpret this contract. It is not ambiguous and

there is no need to go to trial or have fact issues as to

what the parties meant when they signed these contracts.

 

 


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If the court denies our arguments and interprets

the contracts to the contrary then, of course, we can have

fact issues over whether or not they have been breached, at

least at this point as to whether or not the MOA is a

contract and whether or not the lease provision requires

that the preeminent purpose of the project is to protect

wildlife habitat.

Those are issues that we believe the court can

resolve on a motion to dismiss. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. GOUGH: Your Honor, Robert Gough for the

Florida Department of Environmental Regulation.

THE COURT: All right, sir.

MR. GOUGH: Your Honor, we filed a motion to

dismiss also and submitted a memorandum of law to the court.

I am not going to cover all the issues that were

addressed in the memorandum of law but we incorporate them

by reference.

What I would like to do because of the shortness of

time is just to concentrate on what I see as the foremost

important issues.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GOUGH: First will be the failure of the

condition precedent to a citizen suit under Section 403.412

of the Florida Statutes.

 

 


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The second issue I would like to address is the

lack of standing of the United States to bring a citizens’

suit under 403.412. Then I would like to discuss the

abstention issue and the discretionary enforcement issue.

Counts one and two of the complaint are really the

only counts that are directed towards the Department of

Environmental Regulation. They are in essence counts or

claims under Section 403. 412 alleging that the Department of

Environmental Regulation has not enforced the environmental

laws of the state.

As was pointed out you by Mr. Jackson, the

Section 403. 412 has a condition precedent that the

complainant notify by means of a verified complaint the

agencies that it alleges are failing to enforce the

particular environmental law.

Then the agencies have 30 days in which to respond

and after that if the agencies don’t respond, then the

citizen may proceed and bring an action in court.

In 1980 the Florida Supreme Court looked at the

issue of this condition precedent, and in the case of

Florida Wildlife Federation versus DER and concluded that

that condition precedent was mandatory.

If I may quote from a portion of the case the court

said, "While providing that state citizens may institute

suit to compel governmental agencies to perform their duties

 

 


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and to enjoin violation of laws, Section 403.412 sets out

numerous conditions precedent to bringing such actions.

"An interested party must first file a complaint

with the appropriate agency and only after meeting these

requirements may a 403.412 complaint be filed."

So the Florida Supreme Court has interpreted this

condition precedent as a mandatory condition precedent.

This is of particular significance in view of the case of

Hallstrom versus Tillamook County which was just discussed

and very recently handed down by the united States Supreme

Court.

I am not going to go over that. It was fully

briefed to you just now, but you have—the United States

Supreme Court said that when you have a mandatory condition

precedent to bringing this type of citizen’s suit, it must

be complied with, and that this is one of the few areas in

which a federal trial court doesn’t have discretion –the

United Sates Supreme Court says, "Failure to satisfy that

mandatory condition precedent must result in a dismissal."

In this case we’ve got the Florida Supreme Court

interpreting this condition precedent as a mandatory. There

is no satisfaction of the condition precedent and the result

is that under the rule of Hallstrom handed down by the

United States Supreme Court this case must be dismissed.

Counts one and two of this case must be dismissed.

 

 


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I would like now to move on to the question of the

United States’ standing to bring a citizen’s suit under

Section 403.412. That Section starts out saying that

identifying the parties –

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question.

MR. GOUGH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What if I agreed with you and dismissed

the case and gave the government 31 days within which to

refile, amend. Would that solve your problem?

MR. GOUGH: That would satisfy the condition

precedent to the statute.

THE COURT: Is that worthwhile?

MR. GOUGH: Well, the same issue was presented in

the Hallstrom case; exactly the same arguments were

presented there and the United States Supreme Court said,

"You have no discretion. It must be dismissed."

THE COURT: No, I understand. I am agreeing with

you for the moment, but what I am suggesting is do you want

to press the point, nonetheless, even though it is easily

solvable?

I guess I am not making myself clear.

MR. GOUGH: Yes, I think you are. I think it is the

governing law and we are bound by it.

THE COURT: Do you think it is not something you

can waive?

 


27

 

MR. GOUGH: It may be waivable. We have not waived

it.

THE COURT: All right. I am with you. Go ahead.

MR. GOUGH: Now, Section 403.412 describes who may

bring suit. It says, "The Department of Legal Affairs, any

political subdivision or municipality of the state or

citizen of the state, " and as was pointed out to you, the

United States Government is not a citizen of the state, and

it’s not a municipality or political subdivision of the

State of Florida.

There is a provision, a definition section of

Chapter 373.019 which by contrast defines persons within the

meaning of that chapter of the Florida Statutes; and when

you read that you can see that the Florida Legislature when

it defines person within, for the purposes of Chapter 373,

expressly included the United States Government.

So the Florida Legislature knows how to include the

United States Government if it wanted to give them standing

to bring 403.412 actions. It chose language that very

clearly eliminated them.

When you read that statute inter materia, with the

definition of Chapter 373, which identifies the United

States Government as a person for other purposes in the

Chapter 373, I think it becomes clear that under Florida law

the United States has no standing to bring a citizen’s suit

 

 


28

 

under Section 403.412; and, therefore, this court lacks

jurisdiction to consider Counts One and Two.

If I may comment briefly on the abstention issue,

in 1943 a branch of the Abstention Doctrine was developed

which I think has particular application to this case.

I am speaking of the Burford Abstention Doctrine

that had its origin or its namesake in the case of Burford

versus Sun Oil Company.

And the parameters of the Burford Abstention

Doctrine were set forth in more detail in a number of

cases - let’s see, the United States Supreme Court case in

1975, Colorado Water Conservation District versus the United

States.

In that case the court said, "Abstention is

appropriate where there are difficult questions of state law

and relating to important policy conditions and where the

exercise of jurisdiction by the Federal Court would

interfere or impede in the development and the

implementation of those state policies."

The Sixth Circuit in 1979, in the case of United

States versus Ohio, looked at the Burford Abstention

Doctrine, and there it summarized them in the following

manner:

It said that abstention should be denied only where

there are no unsettled question of state law which affect

 

 


29

 

federal claims and that present state proceedings will not

be interrupted and that the most important questions

presented are federal questions of law, not state questions.

This Southern District Court in the case of Rindley

versus Gallagher recently in this last year, in the last few

months addressed the Burford Abstention Doctrine.

Rindley versus Gagallagher involved the State’s

regulation of professional conduct of dentists and the court

said that or the court abstained on the grounds that Florida

has significant interests in the area and that Florida had

established an extensive regulatory scheme and that the

Federal Court’s interpretation of Florida law might disrupt

other areas of regulation.

THE COURT: None of these cases, however, involved

federal property, did they?

MR. GOUGH: No, they did not involve federal

property.

THE COURT: From the sound of it they dealt with

constitutional questions which either had been decided by

the state court – well, if they had been, of course, the

federal court would not have had to abstain, but had not

been decided by the state court and were in the process of

being decided. That’s a state problem.

The federal court should abstain but here we have

federal property that the Government is claiming is being

 

 


30

 

impacted by this conduct or lack of conduct.

MR. GOUGH: Yes. Their claims arise out of state

law; entirely out of state law.

THE COURT: Well, that’s true but what you are

suggesting to me is that they really have no recourse. They

are not a citizen so they can’t –

MR. GOUGH: No, I am not suggesting that. They

have a recourse. They have a recourse in this very

extensive procedure that was set forth in some detail before

you.

They can participate in the SWIM planning process.

They can take an appeal from the result once a final SWIM

plan is adopted by the Water Management District.

They have numerous routes of appeal. They can take

an appeal to the Governor cabinet of Florida sitting as a

Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission.

Alternatively, they can take a direct appeal to the

appropriate Florida court of appeal, and they can also take

a course of review by asking for an administrative hearing

under chapter 120.56. So they can participate. They are

not excluded.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOUGH: And you have as you say, this close to

you – you have a complex, a very highly complex area

involving questions of science, technology and public

 

 


31

 

policy, and this is a type of situation that is particularly

within the expertise of the state agencies; and in the SWIM

process all the experts, all the outside experts can come in

and contribute and they have.

So I think when you apply the Burford Abstention

Doctrine parameters to this case, you see that it becomes a

very appropriate case for the court to abstain.

The process is going on. A SWIM plan is being

developed. The Florida Legislature in the preamble to the

SWiM Act codified certain findings of facts, and one of

those findings of facts as set forth in Section 373.451 (5),

the Florida Legislature states, and I quote:

"The Legislature finds that surface water problems

can be corrected and prevented through plans and programs

for surface water improvement and management," and then went

forth to set forth the legislative scheme for developing

SWIM plans to protect water bodies in Florida.

So you have an express policy and finding by the

Florida Legislature that the SWIM process is the best way of

addressing this problem.

Now, the United States has their chosen remedy to

the problem and the State of Florida through its agencies

are developing theirs, and the basis of United States’

complaint is that the State is not accepting their solution

but proceeding to develop their own as charged by the

 

 


32

 

Florida Legislature.

I think when you distill all this together that

this is an appropriate case for abstention; that if the

Florida Legislature’s directions and the SWIM plan are

developed pursuant to it, it should be given a chance to

work.

If it doesn’t work, then the United States can

always come back as was indicated to this court and seek

remedy or it can take any –

THE COURT: What remedy could they seek here if

they have no rights under the statute because they are not a

citizen?

MR. GOUGH: As Mr. Rogers pointed out, one of the

procedures that they have as participant in the SWIM

process, they can take an administrative appeal under

Chapter –

THE COURT: I understand that. I was just

addressing your comment which said that they can come back

here.

MR. GOUGH: I am getting back to it, Your Honor.

The Florida statutes provide them a remedy under 120.56 to

appeal the final SWIM plan.

It would appear when this is overlaid on the

statute that gives the United States Attorney the power to

bring its claims into Federal Court, that instead of having

 

 


33

 

a State hearing officer conduct that proceeding, that it

would come before this court where the Federal Judge would

sit and conduct the proceedings in the same fashion that

another litigant would have if he pursued his 120.56

remedies before division of or a hearing officer in the

state division of administrative hearing, so they are not

cut out.

They are not cut out of any of the remedies before

state forums, the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission,

the Florida Court of Appeals or the Florida Administrative

Hearing Officer; and they are not cut out from coming back

here if they insist on being in federal court.

So in sum I think that this court should abstain

and give the SWIM plan a chance to prove that it is going to

work instead of just allowing the United States to complain

basically that they have their plan and tat it should be

selected for some reason over ours.

Briefly, if I could just touch on the question of

discretionary enforcement, the Doctrine of Discretionary

Enforcement is well established in both common law and in

decisions of the federal courts and the state courts.

Most recently in 1985 the United States Supreme

Court in the case of Hector v. Chaney talked about it in

some detail. In that case the court said that and agency’s

decision not to enforce is a decision generally committed to

 


34

 

the agency’s absolute discretion.

The court went on to draw the distinction that

whereas under the Administrative Procedure Act there is a

general normal presumption of reviewbility of an agency’s

final action.

This is not so in the case of an agency’s decision

not to take particular enforcement action and the United

States Supreme Court said in that case that there is

actually a presumption that the result is not reviewable.

The court reasoned that the reasons for his are

several fold, that the agency has much better perspective

of its enforcement priorities and resources, that it is

better suited to determine whether a particular enforcement

best fits its overall policies, and it is better equipped

than the courts to balance the many variables and

considerations to proper ordering of its priorities.

The plaintiffs have responded to this argument and

basically stating that the language of Section 403.087 that

deals with permits has the term "shall" in it, and that they

claim that discretion – that there is no discretion in

enforcement that we have in "shall," but the position has

been rejected by the courts. I point out the Eighth Circuit

in 1987 in the case of Dubois versus Thomas soundly rejected

that view.

When I was discussing the Abstention Doctrine I

 


35

 

forgot to mention that the complex – I mentioned that there

were complex questions of state law and I was talking about

the statutory scheme for creating the SWIM plans for various

water bodies in the state; but one of the complex questions

of law is that under Section 403.927, Florida Statutes, the

Legislature granted an exemption to the permit requirements

of 403.087 for agricultural activities, and how this balanced

is struck between those two laws is a complex area of state

law that is more suitable for resolution in state court and

state proceedings.

It also involves very important public policy

considerations because of the potential impact on the

agricultural interests of the Everglades agricultural area.

The Florida Legislature, when it enacted the

Henderson Wetlands Act in 1984, expressly noted the

significance of that agricultural area to Florida’s

interests and economy.

This raises important questions of public policy as

wel as state law that have to be balanced, and this is a

function that’s most suitable for the state to deal with and

the best forum for that to happen in is this SWIM planning

process as directed by the State Legislature.

That’s all I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. ANKERSON: My name is Tom Ankerson, on behalf

 


36

 

of the City of Belle Glade and Clewiston. We filed a motion

supporting the District’s memorandum and we support the

District on MDER in all their efforts to have this case

dismissed, but most particularly I want to direct your

attention to that 1951 contract.

That contract for municipalities, South Lake

Okeechobee, is a sacred document because what it does is it

recognizes the flood protection and water supply privacy,

the primary purposes of the Central and Southern Florida

Flood Control Project.

We think that expression, an interpretation by your

court of that expression, the primary purposes, would

resolve that aspect of this case.

We also, of course, support the dismissal on the

grounds of exhaustion. Belle Glade and Clewiston are

participation in the SWIM proceedings. The United States is

participating.

We think that’s where this action ought to be and

that’s all I have to say on behalf of the municipal

intervenors, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Sir. Ms. Ponzoli.

MS. PONZOLI: Thank you. Your Honor. It is my

privilege to defend the united States on this motion to

dismiss.

As the court is aware, the defendants have a very

 


37

 

heavy burden on this motion. They have alleged that we have

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted .

They did not argue their arguments from their

briefs on the SWIM Act and so I shall rest upon my brief in

that regard also and address only the citizen’s provision

and the failure to meet the procedural requirement of

403.412.

They have alleged that we are not a citizen under

403 or 373. I would point out to the court that it is well

established that the United States may protect its property

like any other landowner within a state, that you cannot

discriminate against us.

If you examine the law of Florida, 403.412, you

will see who has a right to sue, and if you examine the

cases that have interpreted 403.412, it accomplished two

things when it was passed.

In Wetsell v. Duda they provided that 403. 412

provided an administrative remedy. It gives you a

possibility as a citizen or another entity to go before the

governmental agency who should be enforcing the

environmental laws, present it with your facts and your

complaints, give them 30 days to fix it. If they don’t fix

it or take appropriate action, then you may sue them.

In the Florida Supreme Court case of Florida

Wildlife Federation versus DER, they discussed what the

 


38

 

statute had provided. It had given citizens the opportunity

who did not have special injury. It opened up a whole other

area of lawsuits where there was not special injury.

They could come into court and sue. The United

States in this case already has special injury. It already

has a right to come in and sue.

It is a person under 373. In the Florida Wildlife

case, by the Supreme Court, they examined the legislative

history of 403.412.

They found that what the Legislature was interested

in was excluding citizens who were foreign citizens outside

the state who would try to come in and allege that the

environmental laws were not being enforced.

They were people who did not have the injury, in fact.

These people could not be given the special new opportunity,

only those within the state.

The Supreme Court said that the legislature had

wanted 403.412 and the entire 403 Act to be part of a

collective responsibility to enforce the environmental laws

and that corporations could be considered citizens, even

though they were not covered by the definition within the

statute.

There is a savings clause in 403 that says, "The

purpose of the act is to provide additional and cumulative

remedies to prevent, abate and control pollution of the

 


39

 

waters of the state.

"Nothing contained herein shall be construed to

abridge or alter rights of action or remedies in equity

under common law or statutory law."

A citizen is not defined by 403. The United States

is included as a person under 373.

In another Florida case Orange County case,

they found that the whole act was written to protect the

environment as a collective responsibility as cited in the

Supreme Court case and hat a restrictive meaning to the

word "citizen" would not support that. That’s the Orange

County case, at 276 Southern Second, 543.

Therefore, if you look to all of 403 and 373, the

United States has injury, in fact. The purpose of the

legislation is to protect the environment and the

Legislature did intend that such people could sue.

They allege also that we are required under 403.412

to exhaust that administrative remedy. Now, I am not

talking about their arguments on exhaustion elsewhere. This

is really sort of a separate argument, Your Honor.

If you examine the statute, it provides what I told

you it did before. It is a condition precedent to go into

state court. Such a condition precedent is not binding upon

a federal court.

The Supreme Court case that has been presented to


uparrow.gif (122 bytes)                                                                                                                                         40

 

you and argued at length involved a federal cause of action,

a condition precedent to that federal cause of action going

into a federal court, but even in that case Judge O’Connor

refused to call it jurisdictional.

She said that you had to do it but she did not call

it "jurisdictional", and she placed great emphasis upon the

fact that there was an absolute prohibition against bringing

a cause of action if you had not met that condition

precedent. There is no prohibition within the Florida

Statute.

In addition, the Supreme Court obviously assumed

that there could be are remedy within that period of time,

that is, the 60 day notice provision. I don’t think there

is anyone in this room who would represent to you for one

second that within 30 days there could be are remedy for the

water quality violations that are ongoing about which we

complain.

They are saying that they hope next year this

process will provide a proposed solution.

The requirements of 403. 412 do not constitute an

element of our right of a cause of action under the state

statutes. We are a landowner. We have injury, in fact.

These requirements cannot expand or restrict the

jurisdiction of this court.

You can by comity recognize them and you can, if

 


41

 

you wish, require us to meet them. It will be a futile

action if the court so chooses. We will go through that

exercise.

They have for 15 years had a systemic failure to

enforce their water quality statutes. Any remedy that came

up in 30 days is not going to do it.

We have briefed extensively the futility of

appealing to these particular state agencies. They have

conceded there can be no quick fix. In fact, there have

been concessions that there might never be an exact fix to

this problem.

The state remedy is plainly inadequate and under

the doctrine of exhaustion we should not be forced to comply

with it .What to do? We would ask you not to dismiss

Counts one and two because we are not required to exhaust

this remedy if it would be futile to do so.

If you hold we should exhaust it, then we would ask

you to stay Counts one and two, not the nuisance claim.

Nuisance is under Count 2, also. That is not affected and

they have not argued that nuisance is affected by the

403.412 because, in fact, Florida law holds very clearly to

the contrary that under a nuisance claim you do not have to

meet the statutory requirements.

We would ask you to recognize that this is not

necessary, but if we were to do it, you would stay the

 


42

 

action. We will send them the letters. What we are seeking

here is relief. What they seem to want is that we will jump

through certain hoops and loops to get there.

You have jurisdiction over the entire action. The

contract claims are not affected by the statutory claims nor

is the nuisance claim. If what it takes to save the

Everglades are two letters of complaint, then, Your Honor,

we will send them and we will challenge the State to fix in

30 days what in 15 years they have failed to fix.

In regard to the SWIM plan, I think that these are

very pretty charts and they are very impressive. We have

attached to our opposition to the motion to dismiss plans

going back to 1972 that I could quote to you – they concern

water quality coming off the agricultural areas, that there

needs to be an extensive system to manage this.

For 17 years this has not happened. If we are

somewhat cynical that this process will provide us with

relief, you must forgive us.

In the first draft plan of the SWIM that came

accompanied by – I suppose that’s a blowup of the chart

that was in the copy we received – they proposed increasing

the total phosphorous to Everglades National Park by three

times the present levels.

This is just not something that raises our level of

faith that the state process is going to meet our needs.

 


43

 

I would like to address the concepts of exhaustion

of administrative remedies largely, and it largely involves

the SWIM process, primary jurisdiction and abstention

somewhat together because they are all jurisprudentia issues

that compel this court to hold its hand and not to exercise

the jurisdiction that it legitimately has over these

matters.

As I have already told you, these concepts do not

affect contract claims. They do not affect the nuisance

claims.

There is a common nucleus of fact that you should

be aware of that runs throughout all five claims in this

case. It is a violation of state water quality standards.

They have violated and there has been no allegation

that they haven’t – in fact, the SWIM Act says that you are

doing this wrong, go out and do it right.

Under exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is

a court-created doctrine that subjects this court’s

determination of whether to exercise jurisdiction whether it

would be appropriate or not.

We maintain we have no real administrative remedy.

The idea that somewhere down the road that we can appeal

this process, while we are incurring irreversible,

irreparable harm on a daily basis, is simply not adequate.

It comes at a time that too much has already gone. It is

 


44

 

very late at this particular point.

Futility is a major exception to exhaustion of

administrative remedies. SWIM is a planning process. You

will find repeatedly throughout their briefs, our briefs,

everyone’s briefs that it is a planning process; it is a

political process subject to all the infirmities that the

political processes in Florida have had throughout time.

We have had from these political processes years of

increasing degradation. We have had study after study and I

will tell you candidly that we would not be in court did we

not believe we had to be here.

We can say that this is fun but it is not that much

fun. If we thought SWIM would resolve it, we would go that

route.

It is important that we are discussing irreparable

harm, that this is an extremely unique case in which the

Federal Government has an exceptionally strong interest.

If you look at the purposes for the doctrine, under

agency expertise, they have had over 15 years to resolve it

and have not done so. There are standards to be applied.

You would not have to write the standards, Your Honor. The

facts are very well developed in this particular case.

There are no provisions that the administrative

procedures are exclusive under Florida law. In fact, 403

actively envisions collective responsibility for

 

 


45

 

enforcement.

Under separation of powers it is not applicable

between a federal court and a state agency. There are

multiple reasons for not applying on exhaustion of

administrative remedies, the final one being that the state

adjudicatory agencies in this case are, in fact, the

defendants themselves.

Under primary jurisdiction it is essentially a

similar rationale. You have a judge-made doctrine which is

designed to achieve a proper relationship between the court

and the administrative agencies.

If the defendants did not know the source of the

pollution, the effects of the pollution, the tools they had

available are the potential remedies, they might have a

better argument.

They know that it is coming from the EAA and above

the lake and the dairies. They know that the nutrients

destroy the indigenous ecosystems. They know the tools they

have in the various permits and they know that on-site

retention, etc. are sources of remedies they could have been

using for a long time.

As all out exhibits show, this has been available

to them for quite a long time. Further delay will result in

further destruction.

Under abstention this is an extraordinary, narrow

 


46

 

exception to this court’s duty to adjudicate controversies

properly before it.

We are talking here about federal property, an

enormous federal interest. Abstention is the exception and

not the rule.

The defendants have argue that Burford style

abstention is what you should be applying but it is totally

fallacious. The SWIM planning process is designed to

address water quality violations and is a planning process.

It is not an independent adjudicatory system that

was envisioned in Burford. It is not a separate system

where you can go into and litigate in that little

administrative process whether something is going on or not

The Federal Government has deferred action for

years. We had even deferred within this lawsuit, Your

Honor; we granted a stay of discovery.

We have gone slow on documents to this date and, in

fact, the Federal Government hasn’t seen documents presented

to it for an enormous amount of time because of the

discovery problems that we are having.

So I think that the discovery difficulties and the

documents production to which we are referred are not coming

from the Federal Government. They are coming from the

agricultural interests.

In regard to the contract claims, they have alleged

 


47

 

under the MOA there is no consideration. They focused their

whole argument on that – there is no consideration. In

that particular agreement you apply hornbook law. You only

need a peppercorn’s worth of consideration to have a

contract and the court’s are not to inquire into the

sufficiency.

Consideration has been provided in several manners.

The Corps. is obligate to test for water quality, to

analyze. They have stations designated. There are 27

parameters that they test for.

The National Park Service has agreed to attend and

to participate in annual meetings and annual reviews. The

District, likewise, collects and analyzes data.

The District also, as a local sponsor of this

federal project, had an obligation to carry out the multi

purposes of the whole project.

They have discharged some of those in the specific

responsibilities under this particular agreement. They

assume obligations under the MOA. They discharge a more

generalized obligation in a very specific way. That is not

a pre-existing duty.

In short, consideration is present in the MOA and a

further inquiry into the intent of the parties is necessary.

This would certainly not make it susceptible to dismissal.

Under the Loxahatchee lease it is just simply

 


48

 

fallacious to say that you cannot maintain both the primary

purpose and the secondary purpose simultaneously.

What would require is clean water. We are not

asking them to make a secondary purpose of establishing a

refuge for fish and wildlife preservation. The primary

purpose – we concede that the primary purpose is flood

control and the water supply. That’s the agreement we made

and will live by it.

We did not, however, agree to have Loxahatchee

turned into a waste-water treatment plant for agricultural

discharge. When this agreement was entered in 1951,

pollution was minimal. Since that time there has been an

insidious and steady increase.

If they would bring the polluters under control, as

we allege they should, they could move all the clean water

they wanted to through Loxahatchee and there would be no

problem. They have breached both of those contracts.

They have not argued the nuisance count, but I

would like to point out the court very briefly that

nuisance is an ancient and a powerful tool for pollution and

its power in this case is somewhat reflected by the fact

that following the filing of this lawsuit certain interests

in the Florida Legislature tried to change the entire

Florida nuisance law so that our claim would have been wiped

out.

 


49

 

They were not successful, but I don’t think that

they are completed. It is a very powerful weapon in

pollution. Why did they fear it so much? They fear it

because it does not have all the exceptions; it does not

have the exemptions. There are no jurisprudentia doctrines

to keep courts from deciding whether there has been in it;

there are no hoops and there are no loops.

If you bring garbage on to someone’s land and you

leave it there, even if it is not your own garbage, it’s

somebody else garbage, you may have created a nuisance and

the court may be able to give relief for that.

So that is what we would bring out to this court,

that we would want the nuisance claim to remain there. They

have tried to argue that our nuisance claim is preempted by

federal law. That is simply inaccurate.

As we have briefed, there is a savings clause. It

saves all rights for the United States as a person to seek

enforcement against even state agencies, Section 505 (e)

of the Clean Water Act.

In recent years the Supreme court has acknowledged

that state common law nuisance claims exist in addition to

remedies under the Clean Water Act.

In our brief we have cited the Ouellette case and

Milwaukee v. Illinois. It is well established that the

Government may protect its land just as any land owner and

 

 


50

 

may sue in federal court under any valid cause of action,

state or federal.

Under non-justiciability the final point that they

have raised against us – DER argues that the executive

branch of the states government – that they have discretion

to implement the water quality regulations. It is a policy

decision. We have argued that their statutes are not

discretionary in nature.

The Florida constitution mandates the Legislature

of Florida to pass laws in order to abate pollution.

The Legislature performed its part of the

responsibility. The environmental agencies are not carrying

out theirs. They are not enforcing. Under 403.021 it is

the state policy that no waste will be discharged into

waters of the state until they have had the treatment

necessary to protect the beneficial uses of those waters.

Under 403.061 DER has the power and the duty to

control and prohibit pollution, waste that cannot be

discharged or substance that may pollute; pollution or

substances which are or may be harmful or injurious to plant

or animal life, and all of this comes before the

consideration of what is exempted under stationary

installations. They cannot explain away or exempt how you

can discharge waste into the waters of the United States.

373 embodies the same policy. No wastes are to be

 

 


51

 

discharged, and it goes on to state other particular

environmental goals. 373, the SWIM provisions, tell the

District that you are not to divert water to Everglades

National Park. It violates state water quality standards,

or that the nutrients in such diverted waters adversely

affect indigenous vegetative communities or wildlife.

We have alleged again and again in the amended

complaint that they have diverted waters to Everglades

National Park that violate state water quality standards,

that there is a nutrient front where the indigenous

vegetative communities have been affected, that that

nutrient front is moving toward the park and that there are

already signs of change within the park.

I would like to say finally that this is a

justiciable case. It is capable of this federal court

determining that there has been a systemic failure to

enforce water quality requirements.

A young friend of mine, Your Honor, went canoeing

in the Everglades all last Sunday and saw no wildlife for an

entire day. That’s not proof and it is not pleading but it

is very sad.

There are no other Everglades in the whole world.

It is a federal responsibility to assure that something of

them remains. We ask the court to deny the motions to

dismiss. Thank you.

 

 


52

 

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. DREHER; Your Honor, my name is Bob Dreher. I

am counsel for Florida Audubon, et al, the group of

conservation intervenors that have intervened as plaintiff

intervenors.

I have a couple of very short points and I raise

them only because they strike me at this point as at least

worthy of comment on some of the issues that have been

raised.

We generally support and incorporate the arguments

of the United States. Our complaints of intervention,

after all, are also at issue here, although quite plainly we

are the "tail on the dog" on this and we are content to be

in that position.

Nonetheless, there are a couple of points which I

think the court could bear hearing. One is that on the

issue of abstention, one key factor that I would ask the

court to consider is that the defendants are asking this

court to tell the Federal Government that it cannot have its

choice of forum; and no other court has ever done that under

the Burford abstention.

The cases cited by the defendants, where they say

that Section 1345 doesn’t bar and abstention, all have to do

with Pullman abstention which, of course, is designed to

permit the federal courts to avoid addressing a

 

 


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constitutional issue that could be avoided if a sate law

issue were clarified.

That makes sense in terms of the court’s

jurisdiction in terms of their jurisprudence. The Burford

abstention, however – the irony of it is, the whole point

of it is to try to avoid an unnecessary conflict between the

federal and state systems.

And so, therefore, if a third-party plaintiff tries

to bring a claim into federal court, where it would

interfere with state regulation under a reg program, the

theory is that the state – federal court is going to say,

"Why should the federal court, the federal system interfere

with the state system?"

In this case, however, you have got the United

States in court in front of you. There is already a

conflict between the United States and the State. That’s

not going to go away no matter what court it is heard in.

There is absolutely no purpose to the Burford

abstention and no court, as I say, has ever done what they

are asking you to do here, which is to stay you hand when

the Federal Government has come to you as the court of its

choice and the court that it’s constitutionally entitled to.

The second point has to do with consideration. It

is true that we have characterized the position of the

defendants as being sort of academic and hornbook, but it is

 

 


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also true that consideration is a pretty disfavored doctrine

these days in the actual courts, the way the courts view it,

and it doesn’t take very much to find consideration.

If you look at the actual agreement that we are

talking about,  the contract, I think there is consideration

on its very face. The first thing that it requires the Park

Service to do, and I am focusing only on the Park Service,

is to meet at the request of the District.

Now, there are certainly some contexts with which I

think we’d all be familiar, family law context, for example,

where an obligation to meet with someone at their request

would very plainly be a substantial burden.

In this case it may not be a substantial burden,

but I think it is certainly a peppercorn. It also requires

the Corps, the Park Service and the Water Management

District to take such appropriate and unspecified actions as

may be necessary to address problems with the water quality

criteria.

Again, I think it is clear here that the Water

Management District is getting something from this contract.

It is getting the commitment of the Park Service to use such

authority as it has to try to cure any problems with water

quality that may take place.

I don’t think it takes a close reading of this

document to find consideration all over it. The same thing

 

 


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I think goes with the issue of or the lease issue that Ms.

Ponzoli has just addressed.

What they are essentially arguing is the lease says

as an explicit provision of the lease for the Loxahatchee

that it is to be managed as much as possible for the

wildlife purpose, in using those lands for flood control

purposes, it is to be managed as much as possible to foster

the purposes of wildlife benefits to the extent consistent

with flood control.

Well, that’s the whole issue here. Is it actually

being managed in that fashion? That’s an issue plainly, I

would think, of fact.

What they are essentially forced to argue to try to

get you to dismiss that claim on the face of the complaint

is that there is absolutely nothing that they could do

differently than what they are doing and still maintain

flood control.

Well, they have made no factual showing of that and

certainly you don’t have to take their word on it.

The whole issue here is:  Are there things they can

do which will, in fact, manage those lands more better for

the wildlife purposes and still maintain the primary

purpose?

As I say, there is absolutely nothing in the record

and should be nothing in the record on a motion to dismiss

 

 


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that would permit to hear any dispute about that.

I mean, the complaint stands as it is, only if they

could show that it were, in fact , impossible, which they

certainly haven’t done.

Thank you, Your Honor,

THE COURT: Thank You sir. Yes, sir.

MR. REESE: May it please the Court, my name is Tom

Reese. I am representing the Florida Keys Citizens

Coalition and I will be very brief.

One point that I really want to stress is that the

SWIM process is a planning process. It is not a permitting

process. The United States’ complaint deals with the

permitting requirements of Chapter 403 and the Chapter 373.

You have heard the District and the DER say that

they feel that they have discretion not to require permits.

We don’t have the permitting statutes which are

very clearly non discretionary. There is case law, the Mass

Eighty-eight versus Gardinier case which very clearly states

that there are non discretionary duties to require permits.

If we don’t have those permit statutes enforced,

we will never have compliance with water quality standards.

That's precisely why we are here.

You cannot substitute the SWIM planning process

which has no enforcement mechanism for the permit

requirements of the Florida statutes.

 

 


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As far as the abstention, I believe you already

touched on the issue, but we are dealing with an

international biosphere and I think its very major federal

interest to protect that biosphere is very different from

any of the cases they cited on abstention.

Also, the statutes have been interpreted by Florida

courts that we are dealing with, so you will not have to

give initial interpretations to these statutes. They have

been interpreted by Florida courts.

As far as exhaustion of administrative remedies,

with regards to the permit issues there are no

administrative remedies to exhaust.

You cannot ask for a declamatory statement under

administrative procedures. The Mass Eighty-eight case very

clearly states that – no permit decision is also not

reviewable. You can’t ask for an administrative decision,

for and agency decision not to require a permit because under

Florida law that is not agency action.

There is no point of injury; there is no time

period where you can file a petition and ask for an

administrative hearing officer.

They have never adopted their decision not to

require permits for these discharges -- as a rule they can’t

file a rule challenge. So while there are many remedies

under the Administrative Procedures Act for various types of

 

 


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activities, none of them apply in this situation.

So we are left out with no administrative remedies

to pursue. It would be futile to try to file anything in

that regard.

And with regard to Chapter 403.412, that statute

was adopted by the legislature for the purpose of creating a

new and additional cause of action not the exclusive remedy

to enforce Chapter 403.

Chapter 403 can be enforced under a declaratory

judgments a act, in Chapter 86 of the Florida statutes and

inherent equity of Circuit Court in Florida which would be

the basis for your equity jurisdiction, also.

The intent was to provide this additional cause of

action for people who did not have standing. The United

States doesn’t need to pursue that remedy under 403.412

because they have injury in fact.

The whole purpose of Chapter 403. 412 was to give a

cause of action to people who couldn’t prove injury in fact.

So in our view that statute is completely inapplicable to

the situation.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right, sir. Thank you. Mr.

Rogers.

MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, I just have a couple of

comments on the last point, on the SWIM plan. It has been

 

 


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refered to rpeatedly as a planning process.

I gues the point is to try to convice Your Honor

that it is really very soft, it doesn’t have teeth in it,

and it isn’t going to really enforce environmental laws –

that just isn’t so.

The statutory mandate is that the program that has

developed as a result of this will have enforceable teeth.

It will involve penalties and permits and everything else

that is normal to an environmental program.

The beauty of the present proposal, at least in my

opinion, and certainly among some of the professional is

that because it will be implemented by state officers

themselves, the enforcement will be more reliable, the

consistency will be more reliable.

That’s some of the real advantages of having this

land set aside, is to assure that there is a consistent high

quality of water; but the point is that we are not going to

have some plan that’s put on the shelf and won’t have any

real difference for the water quality of South Florida.

Let me address what I discern is a concern of Your

Honor, having to do with ownership of federal property.

Your question went to: Doesn’t the sovereign have a right

to protect his property?

I have two answers to that. One is that almost all

this property is owned by the District, not the Federal

 


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Government. The park is owned by the Federal Government.

The second point is that we will be more than happy

to do anything the Government wants us to do to protect the

park over and above what we are doing now. It doesn’t take

a lawsuit.

It doesn’t take any high visibility commotion, and

I have said this repeatedly and I really mean it --- I don’t

mean it as rhetorical flourish – the Corps of Engineers is

our boss. We have contracts with them.

We operate at their behest. Mr. McVicker, who is

the deputy Director, is in the audience. The Corps of

Engineers can call him up, issue a telex, whatever, "Do

something different. Stop discharging water through this

structure. Discharge it through another."

It does not take a lawsuit to bring about changes;

it doesn’t take a lawsuit to protect this governmental

property. It is easy. It is far easier than the government

will admit.

The fact is that the Corps hasn’t done that . This

is a continuing bone of contention. I know we have argued

our Rule 19, am I am not going to do it over again.

We sure would love to talk to Colonel Herndon. We’ve

been trying to talk to him and he’s like reaching the Dhali

Lama. He’s always indisposed. We still have a motion out.

The Government now says that perhaps sometimes next

 

 


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year we might be able to talk to him, but we ar obviously

going to have to go to motion practice and argue with them

over deposing Colonel Herndon.

We are going to ask you, Colonel, "What do you want

us to do? You have contracts with us. You have all these

rights. Why haven’t you exercised them? Why haven’t you

told us what to do?"

So the Government is not defenseless. Despite what

Ms. Ponzoli says, we are truly concerned over the long term

threat to not only the park but all these areas, and that’s

why a number of very fine people are dedicating themselves

to coming up with the SWIM program that will address that.

Two other minor points, but I guess they bother us

because they have been said on the record. Ms. Ponzoli

referred to irreparable harm.

We’re the ones who want the try the case nine

months before the Federal Government. We are the ones who

say that we don’t need interrogatories. Let’s get on with

it. Let’s get on with deposing the experts. If we are

going to try the case, let’s do it. Let’s not drag our

feet.

We are the ones who haven’t been pain one single

dime for any of the documents that we have turned over to

to the Federal Government. Despite repeated requests, they

 

 


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haven’t paid for a single document yet.

So if we are going to get into who is doing what to

whom, it is a two-way street.

I am not going to continue. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Does anyone else care

to comment briefly?

MR. GOUGH: Three brief points, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, sir.

MR. GOUGH: The United States Attorney suggested

that they don’t have any administrative remedy in a

adjudicatory fact-finding type form. That I submit is

incorrect.

Chapter 373.114 sets forth the procedures for

review of final orders and rules of a water management

district. That governs this particular issue.

One of the procedures of reviews set forth there is

that an affected person can bring a rule challenge under

chapter 120.56 of the Florida Statutes.

Now, those rule challenge proceedings, Your Honor,

are very much like a trial in your court. The parties can

bring on witnesses under oath. The testimony is taken.

Exhibits are entered. Cross examination can be had.

It is in very way just like a trial, except there

is a state hearing officer or administrative law judge, if

you would, sitting there controlling the proceedings.

 

 


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So there is a forum. There is an administrative.

fact-finding adjudicatory forum available to the United

States Attorney.

Second, I would like to –

THE COURT: Let me interrupt you. What about this

nuisance claim? Does the Government need to go to an

administrative body to have their nuisance claim decided?

MR. GOUGH: I don’t believe that is the case, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: Do you think there is such a thing as a

nuisance claim as far as the Government is concerned?

MR. GOUGH: In our memorandum of law we set forth

our grounds for believing that they cannot state a nuisance

claim against a department environmental regulation.

THE COURT: Do you mean from a factual or from a

legal standard?

MR. GOUGH: From a legal standard, Your Honor,

because that nuisance will not lie for the department’s

discdretionary election not to take a particular enforcement

action.

I am not really prepared to brief that, Your Honor,

but I would refer you to the memoranda of law that have been

submitted on that issue in some depth.

The second point I wanted to comment won was the

suggestion that the political process was somehow the wrong

 

 


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forum, if you will, to formulate important state public

policy.

I don’t understand the United States’ view on that.