Hearing Transcripts from United States v. SFWMD, et al.,

Case No. 88-1886-CIV-HOEVELER


 

     STYLE:      US vs. SFWMD
     CASE:        88-1886-CIV-WMH      
     JUDGE:     WILLIAM M. HOEVELER
     DATE:         November 1, 1989

     NAVIGATION:
                          Appearances
                          Proceeding
                          Page:  20 40
                          Certificate (page 50)


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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION

 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT
DISTRICT; JOHN R. WODRASKA,
Executive Director, South
Florida Water Management
District; FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
and DALE TWACHTMANN, Secretary,
Florida Department of
Environmental Regulation,

Defendants,

and

WESTERN PALM BEACH COUNTY
FARM BUREAU, INC.; FLORIDA
FRUIT AND VEGETABLE ASSOCIATION;
FLORIDA SUGAN CANE LEAGUE, INC.;
ROTH FARMS, INC.; K.W.B. FARMS
and BEARDSLEY FARMS, INC.,

Defendants-Intervernors

__________________________________________

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Case No
88-1886-CIV-WMH

          MIAMI, FLORIDA
          November 1, 1989
 

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING PROCEEDINGS
IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER
BEFORE THE HONORABLE WILLIAM M.
HOEVELER, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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APPEARANCES:


DEXTER LEHTINEN, ESQ.
United Sates Attorney
SUZAN HILL PONZOLI, ESQ.
Assistant U.S. Attorney
ROBIN HERMAN, ESQ.
RICHARD HARRISON, ESQ.
Assistant U.S. Attorney
For the Plaintiff
Miami, Florida

 


2


SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM
140 New York Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D.V. 20005
BY:  James A. Rogers., ESQ
Management District & John Wodraska


PEEPLES, EARL & BLANK, P. A.
One Biscayne Tower
Miami, Florida
BY:   WILLIAM L. EARL, ESQ.
          L.G. PEEPLES, ESQ.
For the Agricultural Intervenors

 

DAVID CROWLEY, ESQ
DANIEL H. CROWLEY, ESQ.
Assistant General Counsel
State of Florida Department of
Environmental Regulation


ROBERT DREHER, ESQ.
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund
1531 P Street, N. W.
Washington, D C.


JAMES T. B. TRIPP, ESQ.
Environmental Defense Fund
257 Park Avenue South
New York, New York


STANLEY J..NIEGO, ESQ.
South Florida Water Management
District, West Palm Beach, Florida


THOMAS ANKERSEN, ESQ,
For the City of Belle Glade

 


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November 1, 1989

THE COURT: Good morning, have a seat, please.

This is the case of the USA versus South Florida Water

Management District, et al.

I am sorry to have kept you waiting. I have another

matter that is in trial and we were working on the

instructions.

We are not going to take as time as I had planned

on this case, but I want to take enough time to keep us

moving, and make some decisions on the matters that are

pending.

We have to keep these arguments short. I will ask

each counsel as he or she speaks to announce himself or

herself.

We have, first, some motions for certification, I

believe, that are pending. Let’s take care of those first.

MR. ROGERS:  Jim Rogers for the South Florida

Water Management District. To answer your most important

question, we have not settled the case despite all

reasonable efforts of my client.

THE COURT: That is too bad.

MR. ROGERS: We continue to have paper pile up.

We are asking for 129.2.b certification.

We think the way the case is align now, with the Corps

of Engineers represented by the United States Attorney’s

 

 


4

 

Office, in essence, the Plaintiff Corps is saying that the

District and Corps structures are discharging waters in

the Everglades that violate state law.

They are accusing themselves of violating state law.

They are saying that the Corps and the District

structures have been operating without state permits and

therefore should go back to make application for the

permits.

Unprecedented position for the United States Corps of

Engineers to take. They are saying that the discharge

through Corps structures, their own structures, constitute

a nuisance.

They are saying that the Corps has violated a contract

and I will not rehash all of the arguments that I made when

I was before you while ago last July.

THE COURT: Yes, I do recall.

MR. ROGERS: We are saying that the Corps has to

be on this side of the courtroom. They are a defendant.

We need them there, as a defendant, so that we are not put

between the rock and a hard place.

They give us orders. They have Congressional

mandates. We have to have them here self-standing, and

articulating their own positions, and if we try the case,

you will want them here speaking through their own lawyer

so that you know exactly where they stand on these vital

 

 


5

 

issues.

They may be the most important party in this

courtroom.

Not once has the Court picked up the telephone, and

said to us, go to something different or consistent with

what is contemplated. At all, if the Corps of Engineers is

represented by the Plaintiff, by the United States

Attorney’s office, simply that if you order us to do what

Mr. Leitinen wants them to do, and us to do.

We don’t have to have an Article 3 trial.

That hasn’t happened. That is a fiction that the

Corps is a Plaintiff in this suit. It just defies all

legal hygiene in my opinion.

We are not asking you to reverse your opinion, and in

that regard, we are kind of like brother Earl, we willing

to litigate it to the 11th Circuit only.

Not two courts at once, but we do think that there

is a reasonable error and reasonable probability of error,

it’s an extraordinary case.

We will be up and back to the 11th Circuit while this

document work goes on, and there will be no prejudice, the

case will be moving along in this normal pace, and we will

then find out where this vital party sits in the courtroom.

If we do move forward to have a trial, and it is error,

it is reversible error, and we may have to do all of this

 

 


6

 

over again.

Your honor, as you recall, when I stood here the last

time, and Mr. Leitinen and I got into a bit of a discussion

of whether he did or did not represent to the Court.

I said, let’s here from Col. Herndon, the head of the

Jacksonville District. Let’s not speculated. Mr. Leitinen

said, if defense counsel believes that Col. Herndon is

prepared to testify that Mr. Herndon wants a separate

lawyer, then he should have brought Col. Herndon in here,

but he knows with respect to the truth of this matter that

the Corps of Engineers is being urged by him to a

defendant, simply to deal with publicity aspect of this

particular lawsuit, to identify somebody else.

It went on to say, the Corps is a party plaintiff. If

he wants the Colonel to come in here, he will pick up the

telephone and tell us.

None of the complicated discovery, none of the

additional complications can come about if you bring in the

Corps as a Defendant because we are prepared to produce

everything under Rule 26, et cetera.

There are four pages of transcript, the colonel was

fully on board, a happy Plaintiff, and they were

representing him.

If there were any doubts that, then all that we had to

do is to depose the colonel. We took him up on that. We

 

 


7

 

called the United States Attorneys Office saying that we

would like to talk to him and they said, no, you can’t.

We called a second time saying, please, can we talk to

Colonel Herndon, and they replied, no, you can’t.

We subpoenaed Colonel Harndon. They have moved for a

Temporary Protective Order. So, that should go about two

more years to keep us from talking to Colonel Herndon.

He is not going to support those contentions. We are

prepared to bring him in court and have a two hour session

in open court, if we could.

Finally, as you may know, the District is right now in

the middle of probably the most important pollution

planing program in the history of South Florida, the Swim

Plan for the Everglades.

This is a document that Mr. Earl has put before the

Court as an exhibit. I don’t know how many inches high it

is, but it is enormously complicated, and it is a thorough

document addressing the every issues in this lawsuit having

to do with nutrients, and water balance, the hydro period.

It has got all of the complexities addressed in draft

form giving you a flavor for the complexities in the case.

In a sense, it is where the action is.

The Corps of Engineers now, according to the United

States Attorney’s Office, is a very active and concerned

Plaintiff, is very concerned about the environment and

 

 


8

 

hydro period, and all of issues they raised.

These are the comments of the corps. on the Swim Plan.

It is three pages. Their concern about flood control and

their original mandate under the various Congressional

statutes, their concern is that the District may be going

too far.

A review of the regulations schedule for Lake

Ocheechobee and the Water Conservation areas should

consider the various purposes authorized by Congress.

Additional Congressional authority would have to be

obtained, and should any deviations be needed from the

original Central and Southern Florida Project purposes, an

existing authorized modification is necessary.

Obviously, a well thought out, much discussed letter,

which is telling us, be careful. There are clear purposes,

clear mandated, clear structures that you ought to be

following in South Florida in implementing this Swim Plan

and do not get too carried away with the environmental

protection issues, flood control and your other statutory

obligations.

We need to have them in here to keep reminding us of

that as we talk about what relief there is in this case.

This is an 85 percent funded federal project.

We are talking about structures that are owned by the

Corps. We are talking of structures that are operated by

 

 


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the Corps, but most importantly, we are talking about a

governmental agency, a state agency, which is at the behest

of the Court.

We ask your honor to conclude, as we have, that there

is reasonable doubt as to this novel issue. The Corps’

involvement in the case, it is an extraordinary case with

an important question. We don’t want to go off on the

wrong track and we will pursue in good faith and

diligently the discovery while an appeal is taking place.

THE COURT: Why is an appeal necessary if you

can get access to the Corps people?

MR. ROGERS: I know that you said, as a defense,

that we can raise some of these issues, but it goes really

beyond that.

This will be a very creative interim process. It is

one thing to say that we can depose people and put them

under cross examination to try to get from them certain

facts and oppositions. However, it is quite another to have

them fully fledged as a party defendant in the case

expressing their needs and their desires.

THE COURT: Isn’t that fiction, really? The

Corps is the United States.

MR. ROGERS: I think it is a fiction when two

federal agencies with diametrically opposed and frequently

expressed and publicly expressed interests are

 

 


10

 

represented by the same lawyer.

There is no question that the courts have said that

you have an Article 3 controversy and that two agencies can

be in court on opposing sides.

I think it is a fiction to say that Mr. Leithinen’s

office represents both of these federal agencies.

As I said, the Corps has a long history in this

project and is the most essential agency in the whole

debate. They are not before the Court.

If we take Colonel Herndon’s deposition and we are

proved wrong, we will admit to it and we will back off, but

we are quite confident that we are not wrong.

There is just no logic.

If you read the Complaint and the Prayers for Relief,

it just doesn’t make sense if the Corps is making those

contentions.

THE COURT: Let me hear from counsel for the

Government.

MISS CAMBELL: I represent the United States in

the opposing District’s motion for certification.

Your honor, this is really a very simple question. We

have a final judgment role that can only be circumvented in

extraordinary circumstances. There is three criteria to

look at to determine whether a motion meets this high

burden. Will it materially advance the ultimate

 

 


11

 

termination of the litigation, and is it a controlling

question of law, and are there substantial grounds for

differences of opinion?

The question before you now is should you allow

interlocutory appeal of a motion to join the Corps, an

entity that is already a party before this Court.

The answer to that question is obvious. Joining the

Corps will not materially advance the ultimate termination

of the litigation because the Corps is already here.

Likewise, enjoining the Corps is not a controlling

question of law because the corps is only here.

Finally, enjoining the Corps does not involve a

substantial – there is no substantial grounds for

differences of opinion on the issues of enjoinder of the

Corps.

The courts simply do not entertain motions to enjoin

entities that are already parties and that is exactly what

affirmative defenses are for.

Mr. Rogers’ argument goes to the question of the

indispensability of the Corps in this action. The Corps is

already a party to this action. It is bound. It is here.

And it is available.

Therefore, the arguments on the District’s

susceptibility are irrelevant to the question of an

interlocutory appeal.

 

 


12

 

Nothing can be gained in the litigation by granting of

this motion. No more of this Court’s time can be wasted on

this. And clearly, none of the Court of Appeals time

merits consideration of this question because, in essence,

as you said before, this is a fiction.

THE COURT: Thank you. Is there anybody else

who wishes to speak to this point?

MR. ANKERSON: Tom Ankerson, appearing on behalf

of City of Belle Glades. I would only support the District.

Bell Glades exists because of the Corps of Engineers.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. REESE: Tom Reese, I am representing the

conservation intervenors. We would agree with the United

States position that the Corps is already here and that

there is nothing to be gained, and in fact, it would

distract this litigation for us to have to go to deal with

an appeal at this time, it wouldn’t advance the case.

THE COURT: I assume now that I have heard from

everybody who wants to be heard on that point. That first

point.

The second point is Motions to Strike Exhibits.

This is the United States motion?

MISS PONZOLI: I am Susan Ponzoli for the United

States. With the single exception of this Motion for

Certification, judge, all the matters that are before the

 

 


13

 

Court this morning center on intervention motions to limit

intervention and this present motion to Strike.

The Federal Government, quite honestly, has a strong

felling of deja vu. We hope that this will be the last

time that we will spend time on looking at who will be the

parties to this particular litigation.

Our motions to strike are important to us and we would

hope that you will rule on them because we believe that the

proposed intervenors will try to buttress their appeal with

these particular exhibits.

We have moved to strike four affidavits and nine

magazine and newspaper articles that are attached to the

agricultural interest’s Motion to Intervene.

We moved to strike a single affidavit attached to

Clewiston’s Motion to Intervene.

We have not moved to strike the other three hundred

and 50 pages of the agricultural interest exhibits, nor

have we moved to strike the other 250 pages attached to

Clewiston’s.

We seek to stride these particular exhibits. We find

them offensive for the following reasons.

The affidavits contain hearsay. They contain double

hearsay. They contain lay witnesses’ opinions offered

where expert witnesses’ opinions can be called for.

They contain legal conclusions.

 

 


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The magazine and the newspaper articles simply are not

valid evidence. They are not trustworthy. They contain a

patch work of truths, half-truths and complete distortions.

If the agricultural interest wants quotes they can

continue to come before the Court and offer as truth those

magazine articles, I think that they will have to take them

all as being true, and the Federal Government will be then

in a wonderful position for a Motion for Summary Judgment.

I have a magazine and newspaper clippings like this

supporting a phenomenal number of factual allegations that

I have to prove in the case.

Moving specifically through the affidavits

Anderson/Rackley’s affidavit, the is the general manager

and the vice president of the Sugar Cane Industry, and have

been attending Swim Meetings, he has attended and discussed

a the draft plan with his office, and with his own experts,

he offers their opinions as his own, and the things that

they have said as his own.

He offers us the legal conclusion that the numerical

phosphorous standard is in fact a new water quality

standard.

It is frankly particularly offensive when Mr.

Rackeley swears for the United States as to what it is

that we are seeking in litigation.

We are at the Motion to Dismiss phase in this case,

 

 


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and our prayers for relief at the end of that Amended

Complaint asks for the exact relief and that will be a very

general prayer. We have been in fact criticized very

specifically for that point.

Mr. Barber is the vice-president of the EAA for the

Florida Sugar Industry, and a former DER enforcement

officer. He testified that the phosphorous numerical

standard presents a new water criteria.

This is a legal conclusion.

He tells us what the impact of a lawsuit would be on

Swim and talks of the impact nuisance there will be on EAA,

and again, swears for the United States.

Mr. Carpons is an attorney in Tallahassee and is

giving us his legal conclusions that the District is unable

to adequately represent the agricultural interest telling

us that there is a substantial interference with the Swim

process.

Mr. Buker, is an attorney also for the sugar industry.

He has an affidavit that contains double hearsay.

I need to particularly the address this affidavit,

your honor, because he testifies that he heard Mr.

Thompson, who is the head attorney for the Department of

Environment Regulation, had heard Mr. Thompson say that I

had said, in settlement discussions, that DER wanted to

settle with the United States.

 

 


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They would have to get big sugar.

This is double hearsay because I am hear before you, I

think that I have to address what was said in settlement

discussions.

In those settlement discussions with Mr. Thompson, it

was discussed that in order to settle this lawsuit, the

sugar industry would have to be brought under a meaningful

regulation. That big sugar would have to get its

agricultural pollution under control.

Would have to be a meaningful address.

Those are the things that I recall being said at that

particular settlement discussion.

THE COURT:  I don’t think that microphone is

working.

MISS PONZOLI: You haven’t heard a word I said?

THE COURT: I heard everything that you said,

but I a straining to hear what you are saying. Pull that

other microphone near to you.

MISS PONZOLI: I had nearly concluded.

THE COURT: I heard what you said and your last

subject was about, quote big sugar close quote.

MISS PONZOLI: You heard what I really said. In

regard to the Clewiston motion to Intervene, Mr. Perry is

the Mayor for Clewiston. He, again, gives us the legal

conclusion that Clewiston has a unique and substantial

 

 


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interest and a particular interest that can only be

represented individually in this lawsuit.

That is a legal conclusion. And he also offers expert

witness testimony without qualifying as an expert that the

effect on Clewiston in this lawsuit is different from that

of Belle Glades, they are more dependent on agriculture

than are other communities.

We ask you to strike all of these affidavits and these

newspaper articles. We consider them important in regard,

particularly, to the appeal.

Thank you.

THE COURT:  Now we will hear from the City of

Clewiston.

MR. PEEPLES: I am Jack Peeples representing the

City of Clewiston. I will not take any of the Court’s

time. I say this because the affidavit that was submitted,

incidentally, the mayor of Clewiston is the now the

Honorable Frank Jones who is here today and not Mayor

Perry.

We will not take the time to argue it. The purpose of

providing the affidavit was to show the clear interest of

the City and not as an evidentiary matter.

I will not argue the Motion to Strike.

MR. EARL: May it please the court, I am Bill

Earl. I appear today, your honor, as I have before you in

 

 


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the past, for Roth Farms, Bearsley Farms, WKB Farms and

three agricultural associations representing agricultural

interests in the Everglades Agricultural area.

Those are The Florida Sugar Cane League, the Western

Palm Beach County Farm Bureau and the Florida Fruit and

Vegetable Association.

On the issue of evidence, may I first say that in the

11th Circuit, the issue of, do you need evidence to support

motion to intervene is unsettled.

There is a split among the circuits, the DC circuit

says that notions to intervene are to be decided on the

basis of well founded pleadings and motions.

I believe it is the 7th Circuit taking a contrary

view, saying that in some cases that you need to have an

evidentiary basis for it.

The only guidance that we have in this circuit is the

old fifth circuit, which in the 1960s, where there were

desegregation cases, you had a lots of opposing groups

intervening, they said in those special circumstances,

evidence may be required on some issues.

So the issue of whether these affidavits and articles

have to be considered under the Rule of Evidence, and

admissible under the Rule of Evidence is unclear.

I would suggest to the Court that for the reasons that

I will describe to the Court, that each of them are

 

 


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admissible for the purposes offered, and if not, then we

ask the Court to respectfully consider the representations

in them just as you would in the Motion to Intervene a

memorandum as the Court would normally consider.

Without burdening the Court with all of the examples,

if I may, I would just like to take three illustrative

instances. If I may approach the bench?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PEEPLES: Dealing with one of the articles.

Your honor, this is a Fort Lauderdale Sun Sentinel article,

dated September 6, 1989, after the Court’s ruling on

intervention.

Quoting Mr. Leitinen, the United States Attorney, as

saying, basically, we are seeking a higher water quality

standard.

That is introduced, your honor, not to prove whether

Mr. Leitinen, when we was talking to Fort Lauderdale Sun

Sentinel reporter was telling the truth, or the truth of

what he is saying, but the fact that that statement was

made by Mr. Leithinen.

We believe it contradicts all of the representations,

the prior representations to this Court regarding the

purpose. The United States has consistently represented to

this Court. All of this case is about is enforcing

existing regulations, it doesn’t involve new regulations.


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We think, it is not just this article taken by itself

in isolation, but the massive articles, quoting Mr. Leitinen

and his staff that indicate that, at least, these reporters

believe that Mr. Leitinen made that statement.

The United Sates has not disputed the accuracy of

these quotes, I might note. We offer that to show that

these statements were made.

Not that they were true.

We will be filing a memorandum with the Court, but I

also suggest that these could be considered admissions

against the interest of United States which, again,

wouldn’t be hearsay.

By way of a second example, counsel has talked about

affidavits of Mr. Barber, and if I may approach the bench?

One of the grounds on their Motion to Strike, is that

Mr. Barber is a lay witness. I would suggest to the Court

that this Paragraph 1 reflects his personal knowledge of

the facts and circumstances.

Two and three, I believe would be sufficient to

qualify him as an expert. He has a bachelor of science and

a master science in biology Between 1980 and 1984 and he

has served as a Northeast District Enforcement Chief for

the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation.

Prior the that time, he was employed at DER as a

specialist district biologist and as an environmental

 

 


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specialist. In these capacities, I was required to and did

interpret and apply new and existing environmental

regulations on behalf of the State of Florida.

He goes on to state, in my capacity as the leagues

vice president of environmental relations, I am responsible

for interpreting and determining the impact of new and

existing environmental regulations.

Paragraph 4, he says, I have personally reviewed the

District’s August 9, 1989, Swim Plan and am familiar with

its policies, conclusion and impacts upon the league and

its members.

I would direct the Court’s attention, finally, to

Paragraph 6, Page 3.

Mr. Barber states under oath, as presently drafted,

the Everglades Swim Plan establishes new numeric water

quality criteria, or objectives, for phosphorous discharge

from the EAA.

And as presently drafted the Everglades Swim Plan

proposes a limit of point 03 parts per million of

phosphorous.

There are presently no such water quality criteria,

goals or limits applicable to EAA farming discharges, or

the farming discharges, generally in Florida.

I submit to your honor, if Mr. Barber who is in

environmental affairs, and has the years of experience with

 

 


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the state agency requiring the regulations, is not

competent to determine and to provide an affidavit as to

what the impacts are and whether there are or not existing

regulations, then nobody is.

Counsel for United States, your honor, complained

about Mr. Rackeley’s affidavit and Mr. Barber’s affidavit

coming to legal conclusions.

Counsel, then goes on to object that Mr. Parsons, who

is a legal counsel, his affidavit, which provides, your

honor, specifically the point that there are no existing

regulations numeric phosphorous standards which is really

the issue to be addressing in the intervention.

One of court’s holdings, I am sure, that the Court

remembers is that the intervenors, the agricultural people,

didn’t have a legally cognizably interest because this case

as was represented by the United States the Court,

repeatedly, is about enforcing existing regulations.

We submit these representations and affidavits

establish that in fact the purpose of this suit, your

honor, is to establish new regulations.

THE COURT: That may be what you conceive the

purpose to be, but the purpose is delineated in the

pleadings.

If the pleadings, to state it very simply, create the

issue of whether or not the state is requiring compliance

 

 


23

 

with its existing laws, then of course, we will not get

into new requirements.

MR. PEEPLES:  But, your honor, the intervention

law also addresses what is the practical effect of the

litigation?

I would submit to you, whether it is Time magazine

saying that the real target, after interviewing Mr.

Leitinen, is agricultural in EAA, or whether it is some other

articles or some of the affidavits that you have, I would

submit to you that the practical effect, and we will argue

the intervention, that the practical effect of this lawsuit

and its use and misuse by the United States, is to compel

two things from the Water Management District judge, a

numeric phosphorous standard, and they will settle the suit

if they get that, and the acquisition or the taking of

agricultural lands in the EAA for a buffer zone.

When you read these articles and these out of Court

statements, they are very different from what you have been

told about in this suit. They establish, I believe, or a

fair reading of them establishes that. This suit could be

settled. And this suit, or this action before you, this

morass that have before you, it is being used as a

hammer to compel these state agencies to adopt new

standards not in accordance with –

THE COURT: Let me make two observations. One,

 

 


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I’m not really interested in what cases are being tried in

the newspaper, or the magazines or on television.

What I am interested in is what is being tried

according the pleadings, and if these other items that

you are talking about are not in this case, but you seek to

intervene because you think they will be, then may be you

should wait until they are in this case, but they are not

now, and they probably never will be.

And the second point that I make is that settlement

discussions are really not something that I either should

be, or need to be concerned about.

If the United States Government is requiring something

beyond that which is it seems to be asking for in its

pleadings, I guess that is something that I am not, and

shouldn’t be privy too. Should I?

MR. EARL: The United States has made all of us

privy to it by espousing and issuing press releases and

making it publicly available once they were required to

settle it.

In answer the Court’s question on the pleadings,

there are two counts in those pleadings, your honor. The

amended complaint, not the original complaint, but the

amended one, that provides and even on the face of the

pleadings in interest, EAA and agricultural.

Number one, the United States brings in a nuisance

 

 


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claim to shut down those pumps, and the drain, the

Everglades Agricultural Area.

Case law, and there is a case, I believe it is the

7th Circuit, the Ford Motor Company case, even if you don’t

have a direct property interest, in that case, it is a

property owner who is trying to stop a railroad.

Ford Motor Company which relied on that railroad

sighting for its manufacturing plant, didn’t own or did not

have property interest. The Appellate Court in that case,

reversed the District Court that excluded Ford Motor

Company, ruling, that if you operations are dependent upon

some service, in that case, the railroad service, and in

this case the a pumping service from the district, you

ought to be in that litigation so that you can defend your

interests.

The other count, specifically, is the what was added

in the amended complaint and that is the Loxahachee

contract.

That Wildlife Management Contract, they added as the

count in the first and the second amended complaints, that

contract provides, the agreement with the Fish and Wildlife

Service it provides that wildlife management first

purposes shall be, and this is not and exact quote, but

subservient to the primary purposes, flood control and

ancillary purposes for which the project is based and that

 

 


26

 

Water Conservation Area is set aside.

Again, that was set aside in a large part. Those

acquisitions, in that area, to justify EAA agricultural

productions used to justify the acquisition, and that is

essential to our flood protection.

On the face of the pleadings, those are the two clearest.

THE COURT: I will have to ask you to terminate

it now. Any other arguments? Mr. Earl, you appeared

before whom now, again, the agricultural group.

MR. EARL: Yes. And our firm is also

representing, through other counsel, the City of Bell

Glades, Mr. Ankerson and Mr. Peeples of our firm is also

representing the City of Clewiston.

THE COURT: Does the United States care to

comment on what has been said?

MISS PONZOLI: The only comment that I wish to

make is that the Swim Process is a totally separate

proceeding that is going on in State Court. It has nothing

directly to do with this litigation.

I am lead counsel.

The representations that I make to you as to seeking

new standards, new regulations, you have understood what I

have said. I understand that you will hold me to what I

have represented and that we will proceed along those

 

 


27

 

lines.

So whatever is going on in that separate proceeding,

does not necessarily impact what goes on here.

We are talking about two separate actions and I will

live and stand by what the pleadings have said and the

representations that we have made to the Court.

That is the only comment that I wish to make.

THE COURT: We have some matters relating to the

imposition of conditions. I will be glad to hear, briefly,

in that connection as well.

Who wishes to open on that point? We don’t have much

time left.

MISS PONZOLI: Do I understand that you have

finished the hearing the motions to intervene, because I didn’t

do my opposition if you did.

THE COURT: You may now.

MISS PONZOLI: Thank you. In regard to

intervention of Clewiston, the United States opposes it

because it is untimely, because they have the identical

parties with the City of Belle Glades, they have the

identical interest and they have the identical counsel.

Mr. Earl’s firm is wearing three hats or is trying to

wear three hats in this litigation.

They are wearing one for the City of Belle Glades

already, and they are trying to wear a hat for Clewiston

 

 


28

 

and trying to wear one for the agricultural intervenors.

In regard to Clewiston, we have already, in this case,

the United States, has already produced something like 300

thousand documents.

The District has probably, and I’m not sure exactly

how many they produced, but may be pushing another 200

thousand. We are looking at close to a half a million

documents that have already been produced. When they came

to the Park and the Loxahatchee, they came as the Sugar

Cane League under a FOIA request.

The District came under its request for production and

the two were coextensive. They are all the same documents,

they are all documents that in any way would be relevant to

this lawsuit.

I said to Belle Glades to Peeples, Earl, & Blank, I

said, take what you want for Belle Glades, you are here, we

are doing this one time.

This is not fun.

No, we are only her for the Sugar Cane League, we are

not pulling for Belle Glades. So that I assume that they

are not pulling Clewiston either.

We will have to do this all over again if they come

in.

This is untimely. They simply are coming in too late

and they will cause difficulties that cannot be dealt with

 

 


29

 

causing substantial prejudice to the parties that are

already here.

They are also coming in on the basis of the July 25th

order, apparently, believing that they can litigate all of

those economic interests that the United States understood

the Court to hold outside this litigation.

We understood the Court to have set a clean course for

how we would go. They think that they will come in and

litigate all of this.

That simply will expand this litigation beyond the

bounds of anything that is reasonable.

In regard to the agricultural interests there have

been impassioned pleas regarding evolving facts,

extrajudicial statements, inadequate representation by the

district, misrepresentations by my office.

They, frankly, have offered this Court no legal

grounds to come back in.

If they come back in, they have to come in on a 60B

motion for reconsideration.

They didn’t label their motion to intervene a 60B and

they didn’t do that for very specific grounds.

They know that if they come in on a 60B motion for

reconsideration they have to show you material change in

what has gone on for you to listen to their problem again,

they are already in the 11th Circuit on a legal issue, they

 

 


30

 

have to offer you something that is really new.

They know that they have a heavy burden.

The third party beneficiary claim, the nuisance claims

those were available to then from the beginning of this

lawsuit.

If they wanted to assert them, they could have

asserted them the first time they tried to come in.

They simply, procedurally, cannot present them to you

now. Substantively they are not good claims. The nuisance

claim is a scare tactic. The United States has federal

obligations to flood control. We cannot shut down all of

those pumps and flood out all of those people, that is just

a scare tactic.

In regard to the third party beneficiary claim, they

know that they have a heavy burden under federal law that

they have to show that they were a specific and intended

beneficiary, that they have individual enforceable rights,

and even if they were a party who received substantial

financial benefit, they would have to show that they were

in privity of contract under that Loxahachee lease.

They cannot meet the burden procedurally and they

cannot meet it substantively.

In regard to the draft Swim Plan, I believe that I

have pointed out that this is something in a separate

proceeding.

 

 


31

 

The adequacy of their representation by the district,

they dispute that because the district in that Swim Plan

has made concessions to certain factual points in this

case.

I suppose what they are saying is that in this case,

the District and the United States would be compelled to

litigate whether the sun rose in the east and set in the

west because you cannot concede anything even if everybody

knows it is true.

The business of putting a numerical limit on total

phosphorous, that is within that separate process putting a

practical standard on a numerical, on a narrative written

standard.

That is simply a practical limit. But that is not

presently in this litigation. We are not asking for a

number. We are asking for non-degradation. We are asking

that there be no more damage as compelled under the state

statutes.

In regard to water management areas, that is another

area that I find very offensive from the agricultural

interests, because the United States has never sought a

Public Works solution.

In fact , we really have not asked this Court for

anything other than some very brought equitable relief.

That concept that is presented in that separate

 

 


32

 

proceeding is a Public Works solution. It is not our

concept. It is the State’s concept.

We would have polluters control their pollution at the

source if we have our drothers. There has been no material

change in the law of the facts.

Procedurally they are not in the shape to ask ask this

Court to reconsider this. The jurisdiction lies in the

11th Circuit.

You have the jurisdiction to hear this, and to deny

it. If you were inclined to grant it, we would have to

have a remand from the 11th Circuit before it could be

granted here.

Would you like to here the motion to limit Belle

Glades so that I conclude everything at one time?

THE COURT: Yes.

MISS PONZOLI: In regard to the motion to limit

Belle Glades, as I said before, we understood the Court in

the July 25th order to have put manageable limits on the

case, that you acknowledged that we were saying that the

Federal Government was alleging that there was a failure to

enforce state law to protect the Everglades and I am using

your words, because I don’t want to put my spin on them and

then something comes out wrong.

That thereby there had been an increase in nutrient

pollution and consequent degradation of water quality in

 

 


33

 

Loxahachee and Everglades.

That we were seeking this to enforce already

promulgated State law.

That the State agencies were saying that they hadn’t

violated the water quality laws nor exercised their

regulatory in inadequately.

You kept out the agricultural interveners because you

said to the extent that they are seeking to challenge the

validity of state law or to avoid enforcement those issues

are outside of this case.

You held out all of the vast number of claims on

economic issues. You allowed Belle Glades to come in and

you said that they have concerns with hydrology, flood

control and water supply and you recognized that as a

municipality they were charged with compliance of existing

statutes and regulations.

This little tiny town could come in for its particular

interest, and while you acknowledge that they had economic

interest is not the United States understanding that you

open the Pandora’s Box of all of those economic concerns

that are floating all around and all of Duda and Talisman

and all of those other areas that lie, the packers, the

shippers, and everybody who participate in agriculture that

you didn’t open up all of those issues within this

litigation.

 

 


34

 

That is our general understanding of what you did.

We are now faced with even tinier town of Clewiston,

7000.  Judge, you have to understand that if you put

Clewiston and Bell Glades together, you are still,

something like eight or nine thousand people short of the

University Florida’s students that is how small these

little towns are.

(Go to Page 35)

 

 


35

 

THE COURT: All right.

MS. PONZOLI: We are now faced with them coming in,

and they say they want to litigate everything. They clearly

believe they can litigate everything that you told the

agricultural interests they couldn’t.

We have opposed both towns coming in. Both of the

principal parties. The Water Management District and the

United States have opposed the expantion of the issues. We

seek to limit Belle Glade and we seek to limit Clewiston it

for any reason you let them in.

The United States has a right to frame this lawsuit

the it wishes. We have done so. We put geographic

limits. We put policy limits. We asked no relief against

those little town.

We are asking nothing from them. We would seek to

hold them to those narrow interest that you allowed Belle

Glade to come in and to keep out the others.

I would like to take one second and put a

conceptual framework on this case, Judge Hoeveler, and why

we feel it is so important that you keep this managed and

controlled and keep these people out.

I believe that in regard to the Everglades, we are

in a very special window of time, and in this window we can

see all the damage that we have done, and it is simply true

that there is a lot of blame to spread around, but in this

 

 


36

 

window we know with reasonable certainty what is going to

happen in the future.  We kow.

We cannot put down every little detail, but we know

what is going to happen.  We know that the widow for some

species is totally closed.  We knoww for others it will close

before this litigation is finished, no matter how rapidly we

go forth.

What we we do not know, what is so important is how

wide the window is.  We do not know how long we have to save

the remnents.  It is in the interests of the state, it is in

the interests of the Federal Government that there be some

economy of effort and that we move as rapidly toward

resolution as we can.

It is not in the intersts of these other people to

drag it out, which would be their greatest desire because

that is to their benefit and the window may irrevocablly

close for the remnents of the Everglades that we have left.

So we ask you to keep them out.  The ones you let in, we ask

you limit.  Thank you.

THE COURT:  All right.

MR. JACKSON:  Your Honor, I am Terry Jackson for

the district.  I would like at this time to address our

motion to dismiss.  The second motion to intervene

non-jurisdictional.  I believe the jurisdictional issues can

be discussed first, if that's all right with the court.

 

 


37

 

THE COURT:  If you could do so briefly.

MR. JACKSON:  The city of Clewiston would like the

opportunity to respond to the United States Attorney.

THE COURT; Sir.

MR. JACKSON: Good morning , Your Honor. Thank you.

I feel very strongly about making this point right now

because we didn’t realize when we filed our opposition to

the second motion to intervene that in fact it was a 60-B

motion that was being filed. It wasn’t denominated as

such and wasn’t set out as such. I would like very briefly

to address it.

THE COURT: Who do you represent?

MR. JACKSON: The South Florida Water Management

District.

THE COURT: Fine.

MR. JACKSON: The agriculture intervenors have

still not said specifically that this is a 60-B motion but

they do quote from two parts of Rule 60-B. They quote from

the 60-B subsection 2 and from Rule 60-B subsection 3.

Now, there is no dispute by anyone in this case

that the Court lacks jurisdiction in general. It is a very

general proposition, a very hard and fast proposition over

the second motion to intervene because the notice of appeal

was filed either on the same day or shortly thereafter and

all the matters raised in the first motion to intervene are

 

 


38

 

now in the Eleventh Circuit and this court lacks

jurisdiction over them.

Except to perfect jurisdiction, there is no issue

with regard to that before the court. There are only two

exceptions to that rule. One is the timely Rule 59 motion

or as courts sometime do, they analygize a motion to

reconsider as a 59-E motion like a motion for a new trial

even though, of course, we don’t have a new trial here.

That’s partly because the Supreme Court treats the

denial of intervention as in effect a final order or final

judgment. It is immediately appealable under the final

judgment rule.

They have denied that they filed a motion to

reconsider and they have not argued that in fact it was a

motion to reconsider. So that exception is not in the

picture.

Then there is this sort of quasi exception fashioned

by the former Fifth Circuit and present Eleventh Circuit

which says that for a 60-B motion a court, a district court

has the jurisdiction to deny such a motion, of if the court

is inclined to grant it, the court can so state and the

moving party can petition to the Eleventh circuit to remand

the case so that the court can consider the 60-B motions.

That makes a certain amount of sense in the kind of

cases where that’s come up. For example, a judgment is

 

 


39

 

entered. A notice of appeal is filed. Several months

later, say it is a diversity case, the state courts change

the law in favor of the party that won.

Of course, nobody knew that was going to happen

when the notice of appeal was filed. It doesn’t make any

sense for the Court of Appeals to consider the case if there

is new law.

It should go back to the district court. He can

decide. He is more familiar with the trial whether it makes

sense to reconsider the judgment. So that’s the rational

for this rule.

That, of course, isn’t present here. There is

nothing new really that occurred between the time the court

ruled on July 25th and the filing of the notice of appeal.

They have made their choice. They want to be in the

Eleventh Circuit. That’s where they should be, instead of

trying to flight this same motion in both courts.

My point is if the court is going to entertain the

second motion to intervene, it now has to. It doesn’t have

any power to entertain this new evidence for a motion to

reconsider. It has to meet the rather stringent standards

of Rule 60 (b) (2) or 60 (b) (3) and under 60 (b) (2), one of the

standards is the evidence has to exist before the judgment

or before the July 25th order in this case.

Now, the only thing that they say is really


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significantly different about this case now, after the July

25th order, is the swim plan that came out at the beginning

of August, the draftsman plan. That couldn’t have existed,

of course, before the judgment because it came out after the

July 25th order. So, of course, they cannot rely on that as

being newly discovered evidence of the purposes of Rule

60 (b) (2) .

THE COURT: It is not involved in this case, in any

event, is it?

MR. JACKSON: Not yet, I would say at this point.

Under 60 (b) (3) , they have to show that there has been a

misrepresentation by the opposing party. Now, they claim

we’ve misrepresented things because in our first motion, in

their first motion to intervene, we opposed it by saying

"well, we have the same interests in this lawsuit they do.

We want it dismissed and we are going to deny there is any

liability on our part for pollution of the Everglades."

That’s exactly the same position they are taking in

this case. Now they are saying because the swim plan came

out that we misrepresented our position. We are agreeing

with the facts as the Government poses them and somehow that

creates a misrepresentation on our part.

Well, it actually takes quite a bit more for a

court to reopen the judgment under 60 (b) (3) then that sort

of fineness of statement by the parties as to what is going

 

 


41

 

on in the case.

The Eleventh Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have

said that it basically takes a sabotage of the judicial

machinery, for example, by hiding evidence during discovery.

In contrast we copied 55 thousand pages of

documents from our environmental sciences department. Those

are the people who wrote the studies the swim plan was based

on. We gave all that to the agricultural intervenors before

the July 25th order was issued.

It should be no surprise to the point I am getting

to that the swim plan came out saying the things it did

because some of the things that are in the swim plan have

been said by district personnel in the past in their

reports. We gave all those reports and the underlying

documentation to the other side.

THE COURT: Let me interrupt you. I am interested

in what you are saying, but I have a very limited amount of

time. As a matter of fact, I am over time now. I

understand that you object to the intervention motion.

That’s the sum a substance of it.

MR. JACKSON: If I can just make one more point,

then I will be happy to sit down, and that is with regard to

the third party contract issue, it is true that the issue

over the license agreement for the Loxahatchee refuge was

not interjected in this case until the amended complaint was

 

 


42

 

filed, but that amended complaint was filed in December so

that if they wanted to raise that, that was after they filed

their first motion to intervene, if they want to interject

that, they had plenty of time to do that. There is no

excuse for raising that or the nuisance claim at this time.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right, sir. Thank you. Now I am

not going to hear any motions to dismiss today. So unless

there is somebody who wants to speak briefly to this

question of intervention again –

MR. ANKERSON: Your Honor, Tom Ankersen for the City

of Belle Glade. We have not had the opportunity yet to

respond to the motions to oppose the conditions. We’d like

to have a few moments to do that.

THE COURT: Well, we are going to have to hurry

because, unfortunately, I am in a case that has gone a

little longer than I had anticipated and we are trying to

get to the jury today.

MR. PEOPLES: May it please the Court, I am Jack

Peoples from the firm I am of Peoples, Earl & Blank. Very

briefly on behalf of the City of Clewiston, I am surprised I

suppose that the United States Attorney gages its interest

in a municipality based upon its size.

In order to get her to understand its perspective,

I would remind her that without the flood control protection

 

 


43

 

that exists today, the 1928 storm would kill 28 percent of

the people in the City of Clewiston. So you can therefore,

understand the size of the problem, the City of Clewiston

does not relate to her concern about interests being related

to the number of people in the municipality.

Very briefly, Your Honor, it has been ignored

completely to this point that on September 5th, by

stipulation, the intervening conservation organizations have

consented to the intervention permissively of Clewiston, and

a very precise stipulation has been entered into which

covers every point raised by the United States Attorney.

Jointly representation of counsel between the

municipality of Belle Glade and Clewiston on oral arguments,

hearings, depositions, discovery conferences, all due dates

will be the same and even have gone to the trouble of

agreeing that in those cases where the interests of the two

municipalities differ, that we will combine those

differences in a single pleading.

So I would urge upon the court that the permissive

intervention of the city of Clewiston will not make on

ripple on a burden on this litigation. It will provide the

opportunity for the city to have its interests represented.

With respect to timeliness, Your Honor, no material

changes in this litigation have occurred since the granting

of the intervention of Clewiston. I think the proceedings

 

 


44

 

today make that quite clear. I would answer any questions,

if you have them.

THE COURT: No. Thank you. Yes, sir.

MR. ANKERSEN: Your Honor, on behalf of the City of

Belle Glade, Tom Ankersen. I would like to acknowledge the

mayor of Belle Glade, the Honorable Tom Altman and the city

attorney John Baker who came down here in support of Belle

Glade.

THE COURT: Gentlemen.

MR. PEOPLES: Your Honor, the mayor of Clewiston is

here and the city attorney is also here.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. ANKERSEN: Your Honor, the issue at this point

on the imposition of conditions really isn’t whether or not

the court can now seek to or can now limit Belle Glade

intervention.

The issues is really the parties initially sought

to limit Belle Glades intervention and they did not; whether

the court intended to do so in its July 25th order, and it

did not and whether it is necessary to do o now.

I submit again it is not. The parties thus far are

seeking to limit Belle Glade have suggested nothing that has

changed which would otherwise change Belle Glades

intervention in this matter other than some insinuations

regarding Belle Glades representation of surrogate

 

 


45

 

representations of agricultural interests.

I can tell you now, speaking with the mayor and the

city attorney they are very sensitive to that. Belle Glade

is its own man, so to speak, and is in this litigation as a

result of being its own person.

Insofar as you July 25th order, I would only point

you to you language in that order, Your Honor, which says,

"while the existing defendants are state agencies with

narrow environment and water related interests, the city’s

interests are the social, economic and other interests of a

community of approximately 18,000."

Those were the very interests which this court said

the district and DER could not adequately represent Belle

Glade on. Yet the plaintiff in the district would now

foreclose Belle Glade from representing those interests to

this court in this litigation.

Insofar as social interests we discussed the

historical reliance of Belle Glade on the flood control

project. That pervades the community and society of Belle

Glade and that needs to be heard in this case, Your Honor.

As far as economic interest, we the not talking

about the economic interests of agriculture. We are talking

about the derivative economic interests of municipality,

its tax base, its employment base, its ability to provide

services and so forth, because if the plaintiff’s abatement

 

 


46

 

suit is correct, and the farmers are gone, the City of Belle

Glade will still be here, Hour Honor.

It will be here without the wherewithal to protect

the health, safety and welfare of its citizens, and that is

its statutory charge, I would commend the Reserve Mining

case to you for some discussion on that.

The court in that case pointed out the distinct

economic difference between the private sector and the

municipality. We don’t think that it will burden the court

to hear those interests.

Furthermore, we think and plaintiff loves to ignore

its nuisance claim, Your Honor, but its nuisance claim is

there and the nuisance is nothing more than a balancing test.

For that I would commend you to a case which hasn’t been

cited by anyone yet, but it is cited in every law school

textbook in the United States, and that is the case of

Boomer versus Atlantic Cement company where the court

recognized, as many courts have since, that economic

considerations can impose conditions on injunctive relief

sought under a nuisance action.

In that case it was the economic effects on a

cement firm. In any event, all we are seeking to litigate

is the economic effects on the City of Belle Glades. We

don’t think it is going to burden this litigation. We don’t

intend it to.

 

 


47

 

The other interests which Your Honor recognized

were flood control and water supply. Lake Ocheechobee is

Belle Glades water supply. The South Florida Control

District is the flood control project that is at issue

in this action. The Hillsborough canal, one of the largest

canals in that project by the City of Belle Glade, its

citizens have to drive back and forth over it. It

discharges into that canal.

It deserves to be heard on matters involving

modifications to that project which would have, could have

an up stream effect on Belle Glade.

So the other aspect I would like to address is it

is not proper now, it is not necessary now to limit Belle

Glades intervention. Again, I would commend to you the

Reserve Mining case where the court noted that very point.

I will just read a brief paragraph from that. It

says, "while the court here decides that the applicants

allowed to intervene will come up to bat, nevertheless, the

number of strikes they will be allowed, by way of

introducing evidence, are matters that can best be answered

at a later time."

We think that is the case here and the order is

simply by your court now is simply going to result in this

already litigious action you see in motions to compel,

protective orders, so forth. Maybe we can workout issues

 

 


48

 

where the district and the United States has a problem with

our intervention. That’s the purpose of the local rule

requiring good faith working it our. Lets let that local

rule work before we do anything.

THE COURT: I am going to have to ask you to

terminate now, I just don’t have anymore time.

MR. ANKERSEN: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Now, once again, as in the

past, and I don’t mean to be preemptory in what I am saying,

but I think we have different ideas as to what this case is

all about. We may also have different ideas as to how much

power I have to do what I would have to do in this type

case.

To state it very simply, which is often dangerous,

the case is the Government saying that the state is not

enforcing its laws. If I am wrong in that observation, I

wish someone would correct me.

MR. ANKERSEN: You Honor, I would only suggest a

nuisance claim has nothing to do with the Government

enforcing its laws.

THE COURT: Well, then, we may have to address that

point at some point down the line. But if that is what this

case is about, the state, of course, can respond by

saying one of two things: "Yes, we are and we will prove it, or

no, we aren’t and we will, or no, we aren’t and we are not

 

 


49

 

going to because of the following reasons:"

I don’t know how many people there need be to say

that. I am sure that there are a lot of important interests

involved in this case, but I don’t have the power to change,

the state law as to these items, and I think we may be

trying to complicate, for a variety of reasons that I am

sure are very important to the parties involved, we maybe

complicating a case that doesn’t really need to be

complicated.

If the state feels that its laws are being complied

with and that matter can be proved, the case is over with,

and if they are not, then we may have different problem on

our hands.

I make these comments simply as a predicate to what

I may rule on the motions I have heard within the next

several days.

A far as the motion for certification is

concerned, I don’t think it is necessary. I am going to

deny that motion without further consideration .

I think Colonel Herndon and I think the Corp of

Engineers is available to the parties. And if he and they

are not, I will make them available to you, to the extent

that you think you need to have them made available, and we

won’t worry about a lot of red tape in the process.

But I want to keep this litigation as uncomplicated

 

 


50

 

as possible and move it along as Mrs. Ponzoli has indicated

it needs to be moved along.

Without ruling on the other motions and arguments

that have been presented, I just wanted to make those

comments, and I just don’t have any more time at the moment.

I do thank you for your all being present. You will hear

from me shortly, We will be in recess on this case.

 

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Date:

 

________________________________________

 

I, Jerald M. Meyers, do hereby certify that the foregoing

 

 

 

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