Hearing Transcripts from United States v. SFWMD, et al.,

Case No. 88-1886-CIV-HOEVELER


 

     STYLE:     US vs. SFWMD
     CASE:       88-1886-CIV-WMH
     JUDGE:    WILLIAM M. HOEVELER
     DATE:       May 19, 1995

     NAVIGATION:
                       Appearances
                       Proceeding
                       Page:   20  40
                       Certificate (page 55)


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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al,    

                              Plaintiff,
vs.

SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT
DISTRICT, et al,

                              Defendants.


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Case No.
88-1886-CIV-WMH

Miami, Florida
May 19, 1995

STATUS CONFERENCE                 

 

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING PROCEEDINGS
IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER
BEFORE THE HONORABLE WILLIAM M.
HOEVELER, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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APPEARANCES:


MICHAEL W. REED, ESQ.
KEITH SAXE, ESQ.
United States Department of Justice
General Litigation Section
Environment & Natural Resources Division
P.O. Box 663
Washington D.C 20044-0663
For the Plaintiff


LISA B. HOGAN, ESQ.
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Federal Justice Bldg.
Miami, Florida
For the Plaintiff


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LEHTINEN, O'DONNELL, CORTINAS, VARGAS &
REINER
7700 Kendall Drive
Suite 303
Miami, Florida
BY: DEXTER LEHTINEN, ESQ
ANGEL A. CORTINAS, ESQ.


HOPPING BOYD GREEN & SAMS
123 South Calhoun Street
Post Office Box 6526
Tallahassee, Florida
BY:     ROBERT P. SMITH, ESQ.
          WILLIAM GREEN, ESQ.


GUNSTER, YOAKLEY,
VALDES-FAULI
& STEWART, P.A.
The Broward Financial Center
Suite 1600
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
BY:     RICK J. BURGESS, ESQ.


POPHAM, HAIK, SCHNOBRICH & KAUFMAN, LTD.
4100 One Centrust Financial Center
100 SE Second Street
Miami, Florida
BY:     PAUL NETTLETON, ESQ.


EARL, BLANK, KAVANAUGH & STOTTS
One Biscayne Tower, Suite 3636
Miami, Florida
BY:     ROBERT BLANK, ESQ.
257 Southeast Avenue E
Belle Glade, Florida


DAVID G. GUEST, ESQ.
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund
P.0. Box 1329
Tallahassee, Florida

                   

Reported By:
Jerold M. Meyers
Official Court Reporter

 

 


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THE COURT: All right, This is a status conference

on United States versus South Florida Water Management,

88-1886, For those who are going to speak, announce their

appearances, please.

MR. LEHTINEN: Your Honor, Dexter Lehtinen along

with Angel Cortinas representing the Miccosukee Tribe of

Indians of Florida.

MR. REED: Your Honor, Michael Reed along with

Keith Saxe and Lisa Hogan representing the federal

interests.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. NETTLETON: Your Honor, Paul Nettleton from

Popham & Haik on behalf of the South Florida Water

Management District.

MR. SMITH: Robert Smith, Your Honor, with William

Green for the Western Palm Beach County Form Bureau, K.W.B.

Farms and Roth Farms.

MR. GUEST: David Guest representing the

environmental intervenors.

THE COURT: Thank you

MR. BURGESS: Your Honor, Rick Burgess representing

the United States Sugar Corporation.

THE COURT: Robert Blank, Your Honor, representing

the Florida Sugar Cane League.

THE COURT: Thank you. Well, at least one item I


4

think has been disposed of by the Passage of time and the

litigation, and that is the certiorari to the Supreme Court,

I note from the newspapers, at least.

I do not have any paper on it yet, but that has

been denied, and so the case continues.

Now, I would be happy to proceed with this status

conference in any way that you folks would like to proceed.

Who would like to speak first?

MR. REED: Your Honor, the United States is

prepared, if you would like.

THE COURT: Mr. Smith?

MR: SMITH: We are prepared, if you would like,

Your Honor,

THE COURT: All right. Well, I have no concern.

You are the plaintiffs, so why don't you proceed, Then we

will hear from the others and Mr. Smith.

MR. REED: Your Honor, the Court's order suggests

the possibility of establishing a briefing schedule as a

result of this, following this status conference on issues

arising from the remand from the circuit.

That remand was for further consideration in light

of the Everglades Forever Act. I think the Court and

everyone here knows for its part the federal government is

enthusiastic about that act, and the additional benefits

that it brings to overall Everglades restoration,

 


5

To that end, We've been working with the other

government parties and also talking with the Miccosukee

Tribe about what changes to the existing decree might be

appropriate to bring it into conformity with the new act.

What we would suggest is that we set a briefing

schedule in which the United States or the government

parties, anyone supporting these proposed changes, might

bring them before the Court in we would suggest 30 days;

file the proposed changes and arguments in support of them;

allow 20 days or some such time following that time for

those who want to comment or opposed to do that and a

similar time to reply after that.

I think we mentioned in our filing for this

proceeding, this conference that we've been having

discussions for some time, of course, with the District and

the state.

One unanticipated new issue has arisen which has

not been worked out yet and which we haven't discussed with

the Miccosukee's, which is our obligation, of course. That

I raise here only because we hope to make that part of the

proposed changes and our time to try and reach agreement on

it and get the Miccosukees input before we make a final

determination as to the federal position. That may throw a

monkey wrench into that timing; not one we wish to propose,

and it could be that the Miccosukees, and I am sure Mr.

 


6

Lehtinen may have something to say about it, are certain

enough of their position on the proposal that we are making

that they can say that they don't need further review or

that they can do it very quickly.

I haven't spoken with them about that, but with

that one potential cavaet in the scheduling problem, we hove

no control over, we would suggest a briefing schedule which

begins something like 30 days from this time.

THE COURT: Tell me what you think ought to be

briefed?

MR. REED: We would be proposing certain changes to

the original consent decree which would bring it into

conformity with the Everglades Forever Act, and we've tried

to keep those to an absolute in maximum. They would be, the

changes incorporating the technical plan, which put real

simply, is increased size of STA's so that the engineering

project handles and cleans up more water going into the

Everglades.

The act also undeniably delays time schedules for

doing all of that, and that understandably is a concern to

many, but we think that other things that have gone on in

the meantime and the things that were necessary to be done

under the original consent decree, the administrative

process in the state, for example, have set back those time

schedules, in any event.

 


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One can try to place blame for that, I suppose, but

I don't know that it was possible to avoid it. In any case,

those are the two major changes, time schedules and the

engineering project which is a bigger and better thing, in

our view.

So the consent degree would be as it was with those

minor changes. We would argue I think in our briefs why

they are appropriate and why they should be permitted by the

Court.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. REED: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think we next should hear from the

counsel for the Miccosukees.

MR. LEHTINEN: I am sorry, Judge, I leaned over to

Mr. Cortinas and said, "What was the last comment?" He

said, "That's you."

Your Honor, I think what the government said is

very clear, and it raises some very distinct legal issues.

The Miccosukee Tribe, as you know, has a pending motion to

enforce the settlement agreement.

Enforcing the settlement agreement would involve

our presentation -- we think, actually, the other side would

probably admit it. In fact, they virtually just did admit

places that they are either breaching or anticipated

breaching because, factually speaking, what they call

 

 


8

 

changes, we call breaches.

What they call changes are breaches. They are

seeking changes because they are breaches. Grammatically,

that is what is happening, They are probably seeking the

changes just for the reason that the Miccosukee Tribe has

filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement.

I think that the necessary of the government to now

come in and seek changes is, in essence, their admission

that our motion is well placed; that they are in breach of

the settlement agreement in various places, and to avoid the

characterization of being in breach, they will move that

there be changes.

The Miccosukee Tribe believes that it has been

breached. It is outlined briefly elsewhere, and I don't

think factually today this is not an evidentiary hearing on

the breaches. We seek that. We seek the opportunity to

show the breaches that in many instances they are not force

ma jeur breaches they are not of necessity breaches.

They could have been avoided breaches. In some

cases they are carefully planned out breaches, and so forth,

but all of that is a factual matter. That is what we seek

the opportunity to show in a few instances where they could

not meet the settlement agreement by virtue you of necessity

or true force ma jeur the Tribe recognizes that, but we do

not accept the fact that in many or the overwhelming

 


9

instances that that is the circumstance.

What the Tribe seeks is to have the court enforce

the settlement agreement. The Tribe, as you will recall it,

was an intervenor. It waived its opportunity to continue

the lawsuit in return for a memorandum of agreement that

provides that the Tribe has standing to enforce the

settlement agreement and an actual court order which

specifically refers to the right of the Tribe to enforce the

settlement agreement.

In return for those rights in the lawsuit, the

Tribe chose to not go forward, as perhaps other intervenors

could have, but who did not become parties to the settlement

agreement.

On that basis, the Tribe feels it has an absolute

right to try to show to the Court where that settlement

agreement has been breached along the way.

Now, we do know that the government previously in

this courtroom alluded to or argued that that memorandum of

agreement was unenforceable. I don't think they make that

case again so I won't go through the litany of why we think

that M.O.A. not only is it signed by the government, but

that it is enforceable because Your Honor I think indicated

to them by entering an order that the M.O.A. was an

enforceable document.

They had said the Court had no jurisdiction to

 


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enforce it, and so forth. Likewise, I don't know that they

will challenge the standing of the Tribe to bring that

motion. They did not make any challenges to that effect

here today, so I will skip references to that.

That leaves us with the Tribe's right to show to

the Court that substantial material parts of the settlement

agreement have been breached and that they should be

enforced.

Admittedly, where certain dates have not been met,

the Court cannot reach back in life and enforce something

that has not been met, but the Court certainly has the

jurisdiction to enforce it where practical; appoint a

special master as needed to enforce it in the future, and

certainly we believe is obligated, when the government comes

this with an admission that we have breached the agreement

here and there, and so forth, to take testimony regarding

what the next fastest available dates would be; what the

next best remedy would be.

What the Tribe distinctly disagrees with is that

this settlement agreement must be conformed to the

Everglades Forever Act. The Everglades Forever Act, as the

government perhaps would admit or seems to I think

implicitly admit to the Court, was an activity undertaken by

the federal government and the state government, having

excluded other people, such as the Tribe and others, to get

 


11

 

the state legislature to pass a law that would void the

settlement agreement. They have no authority to do that.

The State of Florida is not permitted to have its

governor stand in this court, enter into a binding

settlement agreement and then change the settlement

agreement sua sponte on its own by legislative action.

The Everglades Forever Act could not do that, as a

matter of low, does not do that as a matter of law. Where

it is inconsistent with this settlement agreement, it just

hangs out there in the statutes of the State of Florida, as

did the South Carolina Secession Ordinance for 100 years

after the Civil War. They didn't repeal it. It stayed on

their books, but it doesn't hove any affect in federal

court.

At most, the Everglades Forever Act is an

instrument which Parties in this court can cite for some

evidentiary value. We passed the act, cis they will say, to

get a funding mechanism to allow us to go forward. That's

really a factual question.

Is their new proposal under a motion to amend the

settlement agreement, which they have had a year to file and

haven't done so, and as I say, probably would not have done

so.

Now, they say, "Give us 30 days to file it" because

the Tribe has finally said after a year and ten months of

 


12

 

the Tribe has finally said after a year and ten months of

this mediation we are obligated to do the condition

precedent in the M.O.A. which we have done.

The Tribe finally gives up on that and says, "Let's

enforce the settlement agreement," and now have a year they

say, "Well, let's conform to the EFA.

To be precise, what the Tribe maintains is that the

Court should undertake a proceeding with some deadlines,

with some briefing schedules, and so forth, but it would be

a proceeding to inquire into breaches and enforcement of the

existing settlement agreement.

It may result, after such a proceeding in Your

Honor's order, changing certain dates of necessity,

recognizing certain other approaches that Your Honor finds,

as a matter of fact, to be in the public interest and to be

as close to enforcing the settlement agreement as the Court

can get and as close to the Miccosukee Tribe's motion, which

is really a motion to enforce the settlement agreement as

much as possible.

If they want to stay in that proceeding, that the

Everglades Forever Act happens to be factually the best we

can do, not the act, but steps that they propose to Your

Honor to do, which happened to conform to the act, then they

are free to argue that, but it is a distinctly different

legal proceeding.

 


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It is Your Honor inquiring into the existing

settlement what changes you are willing to make in the

existing settlement by way of enforcing it.

We would urge you, at that point we would be urging

a special master to keep, to monitor the terms that Your

Honor sets down to report back to Your Honor, and so forth,

so we don't have this year after year of ambiguity and lack

of movement toward the goal.

I believe I have covered the fact that the

legislature has no right to simply void a consent agreement

that the state entered into. I might add, as well, that

there is somewhat of a difficult position legally because

they actually maintain under the federal Clean Water Act

that the Everglades Forever Act does not, in fact, change

the water quality standards of the State of Florida.

They have to maintain that because under the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Federal Clean Water

Act as it us is known, if the State of Florida changes its

substantive water quality standards, it has to have notice

and a hearing and has to be approved by the EPA.

What they say to the EPA is that, well, they just

changed some dates, and so forth, on the way the state is

going about building some public works projects, because

remember these STA's are just Public work projects.

They are publicly owned water treatment plants of a

 


14

different type; big sludge piles, but they are public works

projects paid for with public money, public money assessed

in this case through certain tax revenues of the District;

general property tax revenues, plus assessments made on those

who caused the problems in the Everglades agricultural area,

but, nonetheless, a public works project.

The state can adopt schedules for public works

provisions any way it wishes, but it cannot void its

underlying standard. So when the government alludes to

enforcing or conforming to the EFA, they are just wrong.

The law of the State of Florida is the same. There

is no discharge permitted in Florida which causes an

imbalance of natural equatic flora and fauna. That law

remains the same.

The schedules that they want to use for public

works projects may change. They made a commitment to it.

They ought to prove to Your Honor that they can't do any

better, but in no way does the settlement have to conform to

the EFA, and certain allusions made in their pleadings,

although not mentioned here at the podium, that somehow the

underlying law is changed, that if you didn't give the

Miccosukee Tribe what it wanted, if the Miccosukee Tribe did

not concur in an amended settlement, that they could not go

forward, anyway, because the law of the State of Florida is

no longer the same, that's just incorrect, or if that is


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their position, we need to have them say it in this court

because that's not what they are saying in other forums.

In other forums they are saying, "We are innocent.

We don't need new certification. We didn't change our water

quality standards. It is still no imbalance of flora and

fauna."

Therefore, this Tribe, if it does not find amended,

amended settlements acceptable, or if Your honor chooses not

to enforce the existing settlement, this Tribe, at a

minimum, would go forward with the litigation.

It would go forward to prove, as has already been

admitted, actually, I think the issue of preclusion is

already there, that discharge is causing an imbalance of

flora and fauna, but whether or not that issue has already

been solved or precluded is not irrelevant to the fact that

the Tribe would go forward on first pleading the issue is

already settled, then proving it if it wasn't settled and

then seeking the remedy, It has the right to do that.

I mention that because the ultimate goal of the

government parties here is to, in one way or another,

convince people that the Everglades Forever Act changed the

settlement. That is, it is kind of Just a technical thing

that they are doing in this court, and that the settlement

has to be changed because the underlying legal basis for the

lawsuit changed with the EFA.

 


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We maintain that you should go forward with the

proceeding in the nature of enforcement of the existing

settlement agreement, recognizing certain inabilities to

enforce certain procedures, if there is force ma jeur, but

enforcing to the best of the Court's ability with those

excuses do not exist, and it is a factual question because

the EFA has no law affect on the settlement agreement, and

furthermore, it certainly, by the state's own claim to the

Environmental Protection Agency, actually did not change the

underlying water quality standards, or if it were to change

them, it would be illegal.

We are convinced in other proceedings that we

brought, the pleadings that are already demonstrated in

other courts in this building that the state and the EPA

both take the position that the Everglades Forever Act did

not repeal the no in balance of flora and fauna standard,

despite the fact that a lot of other provisions in the law

look like it repealed it.

We sued and said, "If you repealed the no imbalance

of flora and fauna standard, it is illegal, they have all

come back and said, "We didn't repeal it. You kind of

misunderstood the EFA. We didn't repeal it. It is still

the law."

If that is the case, we go forward here, if they

did attempt to repeal that provision, which they now say

 

 


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they didn't, but we are quite convinced in May of last year

they were hoping they did, but if they did repeal that

provision, then we will just win hands down in other forums.

If they didn't repeal the provision, then let's

just go forward, enforce the Everglades settlement. And,

incidentally, even if they did try to repeal it, it doesn't

have any affect on you because they can't enter into an

agreement in this court and then use alleged sovereign

powers to just void the agreement.

So, we would just like basically a set of hearings,

some briefing schedules, briefings of anything Your Honor

would like; pleadings which show the breaches and the

opportunities to cross examine.

In fact, even if you were to use Mr. Reed's

suggestion, we want the opportunity to cross examine these

people because we've never had that chance. When they say

the Everglades Forever Act does this, and this is what had

to be done, we want to know the hotel rooms they met in

Washington.

We want to know who met in Tallahassee. We want to

know who cut the deal. We want to know why that provision

is there. We want to know why you think it is necessary.

And we would also like them to explain the public testimony

in the legislature of the lieutenant governor that said, "If

this act doesn't pass", Lieutenant Governor McKay said to

 

 


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the Senate Rules Committee, with Chairman Cypress testifying

the same day, "If this act doesn't pass, He cannot enforce

water quality standards by precluding the discharge at the

farms."

The senator asked him, "Well, would that put

farmers out of business?" The lieutenant governor said,

"No, it would not." The senator said, "Well, then, why do

we even need this act? Why don't we just have you preclude

the pollution at the source, at the farm?"

The lieutenant governor said, "Well, administrative

proceedings would drag that out, and so forth. We certainly

can do that, and we will preclude the pollution at the farm

if this act doesn't pass."

So we would have the opportunity to show viable

alternatives that this was a political choice. Matters like

that, that all would be taken up at a different proceeding

at a different time, but it demonstrates why the Tribe needs

the opportunity to show that the existing settlement is a

good one.

It can be enforced in many cases on its terms.

Your Honor can recognize certain deviations from it based on

evidentiary materials, but not by authority of the

Everglades Forever Act alone.

THE COURT: Now, counsel said a moment ago that you

and they were trying to work this out to achieve some kind

 


19

of agreement. Did I hear that incorrectly?

MR. LEHTINEN: I heard that. It is kind of like

the hearsay rule. Yes, I heard that, and we did, and if my

recollection was April or May or June -- I am sorry -- ten

months ago -- ten months ago, under the memorandum of

agreement, He invoked the provision that says the Tribe can

enforce the settlement but must first seek to resolve

mediation.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LEHTINEN: We invoked that in perhaps June or

July -- I forget. July. Those meetings began in July. Mr.

Cortinas has been in them. I have again in them. They have

gone 10 months, 9 months.

We declared them fruitless several months ago. We

see no change. We consider them the kinds of matters that

we did not, therefore, submit to the Court a January, 1995

statement that they gave to us that was saying, "This is how

we want to change the settlement agreement."

We read it. We said, "That's unacceptable. We

don't think the settlement agreement should be changed like

that," and there is slightly no progress. It is going

nowhere.

The government didn't say it here, but it has said

to us elsewhere, or actually said in the motion, so it is of

record in the court and said in their response that since


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the M.O.A. says that the Tribe has to invoke mediation, and

the mediation is unsuccessful, when the United

States is unsuccessful in the mediation, some phrase using

the word "United States," then the Tribe can go to enforce,

they imply in the papers that somehow the Tribe can never

enforce because as long as the United States has one party

to the mediation with us, tells us we think the mediation is

not truthful or is fruitful, our declaration that after 10

months of good faith negotiation we are going nowhere, they

claim is meaningless.

They claim that as long as they say it is good

faith negotiation, that the Tribe is precluded virtually

forever from coming in to enforce. So the bottom line is

that we have talked to them for ten months, and we see no

viable alternative.

In fact, I don't know why what they proposed in

January they didn't move to give to this Court. The whole

goal, Your Honor, quite frankly, is delay.

They force us to invoke mediation for delay. They

go from June until January of '95 when we keep asking them,

"Well, this is to mediate breaches of the settlement. This

is to get your position on what the settlement, the best you

can do on the settlement."

It takes them 8 months to cough up a document. In

January of '95 they cough up the document. We say, no.

 


21

 

Nothing else is happening. We file our motion, They

haven't yet filed it with the Court.

I mean, it would be great, if that's their

position, why don't they show it to Your Honor? Why isn't

it in front of Your Honor today? They want 30 more days.

Now, all it is delay because what will happen,

as time goes forward, is that the calender year dates will

come to pass and they will say, "Force ma jeur. 1997 was

yesterday, You can't do anything about doing something by

1997."

That's why we wanted an enforcement in 1994.

That's why we are surprised it takes a year after '94 to get

here to '95. They just want the delay because if they can

hold these hearings off until January of '96, then they can

say, "January of '97 is only 12 months away, Your Honor.

There is nothing you can do about January of '97."

That's really the goal here, to make it virtually

impossible for the Court to enforce by going through these

legalistic proceedings.

The short short answer is we believe after 10

months of engaging in this mediation, that it is fair for us

to say the mediation is fruitless and we need Your Honor's

assistance to make it happen.

THE COURT: So, essentially you want hearings to

show that the agreement should be enforced and isn't being

 


22

enforced?

MR. LEHTINEN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank You

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. NETTLETON: May it please the Court, Your

Honor, Paul Nettleton on behalf of the South Florida Water

Management District.

I just have a few brief comments. First of all, it

strikes me that Mr. Lehtinen appears to be suggesting that

he wants to try the political process, which I don't think

is appropriate for this Court. But aside from that, I would

remind the Court of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in this

case which recognized the passage of the EFA and the

potential effect on what we were doing here.

Specifically, in its remand direction, it indicated

that this Court was to consider the consent decree in light

of the passage of the EFA. What we are proposing and what

the Federal Government has already proposed to Your Honor we

concur with.

The signators have, in fact, been discussing the

affect of the EPA, the EFA as well as the passage of time

and the collection of additional data, and so forth and how

that's affected the original agreements between the parties

and what appropriate changes might be made to the consent

decree in light of that.

 


23

Now, Mr. Lehtinen suggests that the only reason we

are here suggesting that He are going to ask for amendments

to the degree is because they filed their motion. Well,

that obviously is not correct.

As they point out in the motion itself, the thing

that prompted it was the discussions and the proposed

changes that are being discussed among the parties that the

Tribe disagrees with.

So, it is very clear we have been in discussions

with the Federal Government for some time since the passage

of the EFA concerning this matter. We are not asking for

any kind of untoward delay here.

What we are asking for is 30 days to file

something. We are not asking until 1997 or anything else.

We've decided to Provide a fixed date. Whether or not we

reach full closeure on all issues or not, we will be

prepared to file a joint motion with this court seeking

amendments to the degree as we believe are appropriate, in

light of the passage of time and the passage of the EFA.

As we pointed out in our papers in response to the

Tribe's motion, we think they have a bit jumped the gun

here. They are, in fact, objecting to the proposed changes

before we've asked for them, and we will be asking for them.

We think that a briefing schedule would be more

appropriate to go through what we believe are the

 


24

 

appropriate changes, in light of the Eleventh Circuit's

mandate; allow the Tribe, as well as the agricultural

industry and the environmental groups and anybody else who

wants to either support or oppose those changes, to then

come before Your Honor, raise their objections on the merits

or on the procedures, or whatever objections they have;

that we then the proceed through the briefing schedule and a

hearing be set on the proposed changes that the Federal

Government and the state parties will propose.

And after Your Honor rules upon those proposed

changes, it would at that time be ripe to determine whether

or not the Tribe's motion has been rendered moot by Your

Honor's ruling, or at that time it would be appropriate for

them to renew their motion based upon your rulings, but we

believe at this stage it would be premature to go forward

with the question of enforcement when we are seeking to

amend the decree within the next 30 days,

THE COURT: In some respects, we would be doing the

same thing, wouldn't we, that Mr. Lehtinen asked for?

MR. NETTLETON: Except, Your Honor, I think

procedurally we would be going about it backwards. What we

would be doing is determining which dates are appropriate to

change or not change, and that is what we intend to argue in

our motion essentially.

THE COURT: Just dates?

 


25

MR. NETTLETON: There may be additional matters as

well, Your Honor. As counsel indicated for the Federal

Government, most of the question relates to dates and the

passage of time.

I might also point out that this is not just a

question of whether the law has changed or whether there is

a legal impediment. There has been substantial litigation

in the state proceedings, as Your Honor recognized in the

consent decree was going to occur.

THE COURT: The administrative process?

MR. NETTLETON: The administrative process, yes,

Your Honor. That lasted for well over two years, where we

could never get the SWIM plan or the permit that was

contemplated in the original consent decree finally adopted.

Because of the pendency of the litigation, it never became

final.

Before that happened, we had no ability to go out

and take any property to start constrution of STA's, and so

forth, other than through voluntary agreements to sell,

which, in fact, did occur, and we've acquired approximately

I think in 1994, we have acquired over of ten thousand acres

of the property already for the STA's.

So things are moving forward. Although we've been

delayed through the litigation, and so forth, we are moving

as quickly as we can. I am not here to debate Mr. Lehtinen

 


26

on the facts of whether we could have moved faster or not

faster. I think that is something that be addressed in the

brief we are proposing, but I would suggest and concur with

the Federal Government that the appropriate approach here

would be for us to come to the Court and ask for what we

believe ore the appropriate changes, and support that with

our positions and why we believe they are appropriate and

allow the other parties then to either agree or disagree and

present the arguments to the Court in that fashion.

THE COURT: These would be appropriate changes to

the settlement agreement?

MR. NETTLETON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. NETTLETON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. More from one of the

plaintiff's groups.

MR. GUEST: David Guest representing the

environmental organization intervenors. Our position on

this matter is that the time delays in the Everglades

Forever Act are not really justified or in the public

interest and, therefore, we see the matter of the amendments

to the act that changed those deadlines as raising questions

of fact, are these really necessary, or ore they a product

of the political process?

So we continue occur to that extent with the

 


27

Miccosukees, that that really is an issue that ought to be

brought to the forefront. So, we agree with the idea of a

briefing schedule. We also concur with the Miccosukees in

saying that this is really a situation where the government

parties are really not in compliance with the settlement

agreement at all at this stage.

It would be more appropriate to frame it more in

the context of an enforcement proceeding with the defense

being that we have had some legislative activity. We have

had some litigation.

THE COURT: All right, sir. Thank you,

MR. GUEST: Yes. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right, gentlemen, I think you are

up.

MR. SMITH: May it please, Your Honor, Robert

Smith.

I believe Your Honor asked the pertinent question

to the government, and it was, "What do you think we should

be briefing?" I don't believe you got a direct answer to

that. That is the matter before us. I think you got an

indirect answer from the government, which goes like this:

"We should be briefing why under law and under the

prior decree of this Court, February of '92, and under the

terms of the Court of Appeals opinion in 1991, 1994, why

most of the former settlement agreement should survive in a

 


28

new decree of this Court, despite the fact that it was

rejected by the Florida legislature."

The Tribe wants to brief the question why, as a

matter of law, the prior orders, decrees of this Court, of

the Court of Appeals, all of the settlement agreement, the

former settlement agreement, should be reinstated by a new

decree of this Court, despite the failure of the conditions

subsequent that by this Court's order of February, 92 the

former settlement was to take effect or not. Of course, it

didn't. It didn't take effect.

Our position is very simple. Your Honor's decree

mandated no result in state law, That should resonate.

Rather, it set in motion a process. It is a direct quote

from your Your Honor's February, '92 decree.

The Court of Appeals found that particularly

significant, quoting it at page 1659 of the 1994 decision.

"The District court concluded," quoting Your

Honor's order, as published in Federal Supplement, "The

agreement does no more than set in motion a process.

The agreement affects a transfer of these

proceedings to a state administrative forum."

That process was intended, expressly, to endorse

and validate, or to reject and modify the settlement

agreement that was then before Your Honor for approval.

Your Honor remitted the Parties and that settlement

 


29

agreement to that SWIM Plan process, with the aim very

forceably expressed by Your Honor, as urged by the state and

federal lawyers, that the state agencies should feel

entirely free to do their duty as they saw it under the law

and the evidence.

And so later, the federal and the state agencies,

they say, because they were frustrated with delay -- we can

argue why. At any rate, they went to the 1994 legislature

two weeks before our hearing was to begin and asked the

legislature to substitute its judgment for that of the SWIM

Plan process which we were prepared to go to hearing on.

The result was the enactment of Chapter 94115, the

so-called Everglades Forever Act which the governor signed

into the law and Secretary Babbitt celebrated it in almost

the same terms as Mr. Reed does here today.

The 1994 legislation is the state response by a

constitutional body this time, not an administrative

process, by a constitutional body to the Court's decree.

Instead of acting through its administrative

process, the State of Florida has acted with the full power

of its legislative authority. The only question is whether

that act is a satisfaction of this Court's judgment,

We submit that it is. We submit this, litigation is

over. We are here today that Your Honor described in that

February, '92 decree where you said, after saying what the

 


30

state parties, what the state administrative process was

going to do, had power to do, and you expressed your fervent

hope that those who participated in it would do their duty

as they saw it, and then you added, "The United States,

having the right to be in this court, has the right to

return to this Court if it is not satisfied with its

remedies in the administrative process."

So we think it is time for the United States to

advise Your Honor whether the Everglades Forever Act

satisfies this litigation and, therefore, ends it, or

whether the United States is not satisfied that the Florida

legislature itself has taken over dictating the duties of

these Florida agencies.

If the United States is satisfied, then we need

from Your Honor an amended decree which substitutes the EFA

entirely for the original and now obsolete settlement

agreement, as the complete expression of the state's

obligation.

Since this is legislative action binding on the

state agencies, the former settlement agreement, a

contingent undertaking by the agencies, which not now be

validated by process of state law because the legislature

cancelled, obliterated the SWIM plant hearing, should be

dissolved, or if the United States is not satisfied, then

Your Honor has already answered the question of what should

 


31

 

be taking place here today.

You have already specified that our agaendo is here

today. If the United States is not satisfied that the EFA

is the complete, authentic expression of Florida's

obligation in the premises, "The United States retains the

right to return to this Court and have the dispute resolved

in a federal forum."

That's pretty close to what the Tribe is saying.

However, for any remaining despite to be resolved, it must

first be identified. The United States should, therefore,

be called on to specify wherein, if at all, it is not

entirely satisfied with the Everglades Forever Act and what

additional obligation the United States wishes this Court to

impose.

Insofar as any remaining dispute relates to the

fixing of numeric limits on nutrients in the park or refuge

or emanating from the EAA, He farmers retain the rights we

had before as intervenors to particiapte in this Court's

resolution of that dispute, and we would point out to Your

Honor that this is no abstract matter.

We would like to mention 2 or 3 specific areas

relating to the fixing of those numeric limits in which the

settlement agreement was quite specific in creating

obligations on the state agencies, impacting the farmers in

which the EFA is conspicuously silent, the legislature

 


32

 

having declined to impose those duties by Florida law on the

Florida agencies.

First, the federally dominated technical Oversight

Committee about which You have heard so much from the Tribe,

so prominent in the settlement agreement and the proposed

SWIM Plan. An element of the SWIM Plan which was to be

tested by the state administrative process is killed by this

legislation.

It is not recognized by this legislation, There

has been no legislation structurally changing the South

Florida Water Management District to create a new decision

making body in its midst dominated by federal appointees,

It has not happened.

Now, the TOC was explicitly empowered by the former

settlement agreement to direct the research, monitoring and

compliance functions of the District and to absolutely

control the determination of the eventual numeric limits on

phosphorus for the park and refuge,

The legislature, having been presented the

opportunity to enfranchise the TOC structurally in the

District, and having declined to do so, then the existence

of the TOC depends upon Your Honor ordaining its existence.

So if the United States is unsatisfied with on EFA

which does not make the TOC port of the statutory structure

of the District, then the United States should now advise

 


33

 

Your Honor of that and, Your Honor, assuming you have the

power to take up such a question, should decide it.

Now, secondly, the settlement agreement adopts a

very specific definition of the critical phrase imbalance of

natural flora and fauna which relates directly to, if it

does not entirely control the fixing of numeric criteria

regarding governing nutrients in the Everglades.

That definition is a driving force of the proposed

SWIM Plan interim and long term limits, and it was to have

been tested by evidence and arguments in the Swim Plan

proceeding. It was explicitly a part of the SWIM Plan. We

were prepared to go to trial on that in exactly the way that

Your Honor contemplated, expecting the hearing officer and

the District to do their duty exactly as Your Honor urged

them to do, and the legislature dealing with the impatient

government people says, "We will take it out of the hands of

this process. We will decide the matter."

That phrase is not defined by the EFA. Certainly

it does not use that very specific definition that was in

the former settlement agreement.

So by what authority do my friends come and speak

of that definition as surviving an event which Your Honor

said must occur, if it is to be validated, and which never

occurred and which cannot occur because it has been

displaced by an act of the legislature which does not in any

 


34

terms endorse that definition.

Thirdly, so I say if that standard is to have any

vitality as Florida law today, it must do so because Your

Honor orders it.

Third, the settlement agreement specifies certain

phosphorus load reductions from the EAA to be achieved by

1997, and it specified these interim and long term

phosphorus limits for the park and refuge, and that is what

these folks are talking about.

The EFA did not enact those measures. The SWIM

Plan contained them explicitly. We were prepared to show

that they were wrongly premised. Factually they were wrong.

Scientifically they were wrong. The EFA vitiated the

process by which we were to be heard, which Your Honor

assured us we would be heard.

The EFA enacted a whole new set of standards and

rules applicable to these Florida agencies, and it didn't

say a blessed thing about these interim and long term

phosphorus limits. It did not enact those measures.

Therefore, are the Florida agencies now to be

responsive to its legislature, or ore they to be responsive

to the former settlement agreement? If the former

settlement agreement has some residual effect upon these

agencies, Your Honor, it is not because they agree. They

agreed conditionally upon Your Honor's approval, you

 


35

remember and Your Honor approved conditionally upon it

being validated by the SWIM Plan Process, Remember?

So, if they agree today it is a new agreement, and

I say to you they don't have any authority under the

Everglades Forever Act to make any such agreement here

today, certainly they don't have that power to make it and

exclude us, or even the Tribe, from the process by which

that is to be done.

Normally, it would be done in administrative

process. So there are other standards and processes in the

former settlement agreement which, obviously, were neither

adopted in the Swim Plan nor enacted as law by the Florida

legislature.

The United States knows what those measures are and

must decide whether it is satisfied with an act that does

not ordain, endorse or enact those measures. The

legislature's entire approach to this matter was different

from that of the former settlement agreement, whereas the

former settlement agreement focused exclusively or nearly so

on phrosphorus, the legislature took a broader and more

balanced approach.

This is why Mr. Reed likes it. "Pursuing solutions

to issues, and I am quoting, "water quality, water quantity,

hydro period, invasion of exotic species."

The settlement agreement altogether ignored the

 


36

 

moderating provisions in Florida water quality standards

which can allow farmers to survive in the EAA, but the

legislature recognizes that counter-balancing effect, the

need to save the products and jobs and economic well being

of the area.

The EFA, in other words, enacts some elements of

the former settlement agreement, modifies others and rejects

still others. The United States must, therefore, state

under Your Honor's February, 1992 degree, they come back to

this Court and state wherein they are not satisfied with the

state's response to Your Honor's decree.

There is no reason for you to change the rules.

You stated what the rules were. The EFA stands in the place

of the administrative process, albeit with for greater

constitutional authority. And if the United States is

dissatisfied with the EFA and wants to add some obligations,

then they should come here and state what those additional

obligations are.

The state agencies certainly need to know wherein

where they are responsible to Your Honor and wherein they

are responsible to the legislature over and above the

Everglades Forever Act.

The legislature needs to know wherein the United

States which sought the EFA and subjected itself to the

legislative process and whose Secretary of the Interior

 


37

publicly pronounced himself well satisfied, wherein they are

now dissatisfied.

The Public needs to know whether the United States

repudiates what Secretary Babbitt said, that this act was

based upon the best science, secured fundings, established a

fixed time table for restoration activities, provided for

extensive research and imposes a regulatory program on

agricultural discharge.

He says, "To miss this opportunity in favor of

going back to court or in the hope of achieving a perfect

bill down the road would invite castastrophe. That's Bruce

Babbitt or his signature and letterhead on April 15, 1994,

So the farmers need to know. The Tribe needs to

know in what respect the United States is unsatisfied or

satisfied. If structural changes or substantive regulatory

themes are to be imposed on these agencies, independent of

existing Florida law, then either they must come from a

constitutional adjudication by this court or they are open

to challenge by the farmers and the Tribe as well in state

processes where such challenges may be entertained.

I say this respectfully, sir, if additional burdens

were to be imposed on the agencies over and above the EFA by

order of this Court, or by the coercive effect of litigation

in this court, then again I will remind you that the

Eleventh Circuit disposed of our case of controversy appeal

 


38

in a manner that depended entirely on that court saying that

Your Honor remitted the decision to firm and final

resolution by the state administrative process.

So, if the Everglades Forever Act does not firmly

and finally have that effect, we must ask again what

standing the United States and by justiciable standards they

can be ordained, despite the Tenth Amendment and the federal

structure of the Constitution.

So is the United States entirely satisfied with the

EFA, or wherein is the United States not satisfied? That

should be the question first addressed.

The United States should be called on to within 30

days, or whatever period, to specify, in paragraphs that are

numbered so that we can identify them, what additional

obligations they wish to impose on the state agencies over

and above what is written in the Everglades Forever Act.

They would like to do it the other way around.

They would like to say what they would like to change and

then have one little paragraph at the end that says, "The

former settlement agreement in all other respects is

validated and endorsed."

No. Your Honor stated the rules of this. If they

are unsatisfied with the EFA you said in 1992, let them come

back and specify wherein they are unsatisfied, If we cannot

resolve it, then we will have to have some litigation, and

 


39

 

with it we will have to have a renewed constitutional

challenge. Thank you, sir,

THE COURT: All right, sir. Thank you.

MR. BURGESS: Rick Burgess. Good afternoon, Your

Honor, Rick Burgess of Gunster, Yoakley, Valdes-Fauli &

Stewart for the United States Sugar Corporation, a member of

the Florida Sugar Cane League, and who is a defendant

intervenor in this cause.

Your Honor, on behalf of United States Sugar, we

filed a motion for substitution. I know the time has not

passed for response yet, but the signatory parties to the

settlement agreement, as we identified in our motion, have

no opposition to the substitution, nor did the other farm

interests.

I know it has not been noticed. We are not on

hearing on it today, but I wanted to point that out. That's

why I am before you on behalf of U.S. Sugar as a member of

the League.

Your Honor, while we may not yet be a formal party,

we are, nonetheless, an interested person in the proceeding,

and we would join in the request that a comprehensive

briefing schedule be established for the purpose of

responding to the remand from the Eleventh Circuit.

In other words, consideration of the memorandum of

opinion and the settlement agreement, in light of the


uparrow.gif (122 bytes)                                                                                                                                      40

 

passage of the EFA, which passed during the pendency of the

appeal. Our request is predicated on the fact is Your Honor

will recall that the Eleventh Circuit's opinion and, indeed,

your memorandum opinion recognized the right of the form

interests to participate in the case, to the extent that

your order numerically interpreted the narrative water

quality standards of the State of Florida.

Now, as stated by the Eleventh Circuit, your order

didn't do that. Instead, as Mr. Smith mentioned, it turned

that process back to the state administrative process. We

agree with Mr. Smith that the legislation, the EFA was, in

fact, the authentic state response to the process which this

Court mandated, and that the EFA, therefore, takes the place

of the settlement agreement, or at a very minimum, requires

its substantial modification or revision.

And to the extent that the Tribe or the United

States will argue that the EFA was not that response, then

United States Sugar would like the opportunity to be heard

on that point.

Your Honor, the EFA requires United States Sugar

and others similarly situated, EEA land holders, to pay a

minimum payment of $25.00 per acre. In U. S. Sugar's case,

with over 100,000 acres in production subject to the tax, we

are talking in excess of 3 million dollars a year. So,

financially, United States Sugar is a stake holder in the

 


41

EFA.

Therefore, Your Honor, with respect to any papers

that the settling parties might file interpreting the

obligation of United States Sugar, under the EFA we would

like the opportunity to respond.

THE COURT: All right, sir.

MR. BURGESS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BLANK: Your Honor, Robert Blank representing

the Florida Sugar Cane League. I really have nothing more

to add to the substance of what has been argued before the

Court, but I was asked to appear here today to confirm that

the League has consented to the substitution of United

States Sugar.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Let's hear

further from the federal government in response because, of

course, I am getting mixed messages.

MR. REED: Thank You, Your Honor.

The first point, while I am thinking of it, is that

there has been a lot of suggestion by the others that we are

somehow acting already contrary to this decree in the way we

are proceeding with the present issue.

We don't think we are. We think that decree

requires us, the signatory parties to the stipulation, to

get together, try to work out our differences before coming

 


42

back to the Court.

There is that process setting up. That is what we

thought we were doing. Others seem to be rushing in here

with their different ideas of where we should be going and

what orders. That's the orders set out by the decree.

I don't think it is a substantive issue, but it

seems to me we might as will stick with it as long as we

agreed to it back then.

The confusion that seemed to arise I think during

Mr. Lehtinen's argument, I may have misstated something. We

were talking about going back to the Tribe with, under our

memo of agreement, our memorandum of agreement with them,

which requires us to consult with the Tribe before making

final decisions.

I think that his statements apparently assume

something else, and I am not sure what it was, but that's

all we were talking about. We have gone back to them with

the first round, those things that we thought we had about

reached a decision on and wanted to make sure that they had

their opportunity to come in, and then this one additional

problem came up which we mentioned in our papers which we

hoped to reach agreement on.

As counsel for the District said, if we don't, we

will just submit changes that we have reached agreement on,

but if it looks like there is room for agreement on that, we

 


43

 

will go back to the Tribe for their opportunity to comment

on that one thing. Simply, the memo of agreement

requirement on our part, and the Tribe may have taken that

to be something more substantive then was intended.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Lehtinen, in contrast to what

Mr. Smith has said, says that the act of the legislature,

the EFA is all very nice, but it really doesn't have a whole

lot to do with the settlement agreement. It doesn't set

aside the agreement.

To the extent that it conflicts with it, it doesn't

change it. The agreement is the agreement. And to the

extent that the EFA does not conform to the agreement, the

agreement ought to be enforced.

Now, Mr. Smith says that the EFA, because it was

endorsed and consented to by both the state officials and

the Federal Government and approved and, in fact, lauded by

some, is, in fact, the culmination of what I ordered back in

'92, and that is where we are.

He is in favor of going ahead with that. And to

the extent that any changes are made, he wants the chance to

litigate them. Those two positions are somewhat diverse,

MR. REED: They are, indeed.

THE COURT: Where are you on this?

MR. REED: We find ourselves in the middle of that,

Your Honor. I think those are both very ligitmate legal

 


44

 

arguments. When we come back to this argument on argument

day, they will be made. I perfectly made in this briefing

schedule that we suggested, I think we are in the middle.

We do like the Everglades Forever Act. It does all

the additional things that have been mentioned here. I

think it is better for the Everglades. The only bad thing

is that is that it delays things, but I am afraid things are

delayed, like it or not, in any case,

I think that those issues will be briefed. I am

certain they will be by the sugar people when they respond

to our motion for amendments to this thing, and certainly by

the Miccosukees, too, saying it should not be amended at

all.

I can tell you, just from the federal perspective,

that we like having a consent decree which makes the whole

thing more enforceable to us. There was state law before

the Everglades Forever Act, of course. That is what this

Court and the state administrative process were going to

apply, and yet we had to come to court to get it enforced.

So it is not enough to say that just because there

is a state law which puts requirments on people, that we

should be satisfied with that and not take advantage of a

decree that we already have.

THE COURT: I follow you.

MR. REED: On the other hand, with so much more in

 


45

 

this new act, we would like to bring that into the decree so

we have it enforceable by Your Honor, also. It may be a

little greedy on our part, but it is going to help clean up

the Everglades we hope eventually.

If we can bring the new good parts of the

Everglades Forever Act under the umbrella of this Court and

its decree, we are in a stronger position, and we will argue

for that position.

THE COURT: You want the best of both worlds.

MR. REED: Indeed, we do.

THE COURT: And Mr. Smith thinks that the best of

both worlds has been accomplished in the Everglades Forever

Act.

MR. REED: He does,

THE COURT: Mr. Lehtinen doesn't.

MR. REED: Yes.

THE COURT: And so we are going to argue about

that.

MR. REED: I think that's right.

THE COURT: You would like your proposed

scheduling, your briefing schedule to be put into operation,

MR. REED: We would, Your Honor. Although, I

respect the Tribe's position, it has a pending motion, also,

it seems to me that the District was right when it said that

it only makes sense in the efficiency sense to deal with it

 


46

 

after we've decided what the existing decree is.

If it isn't changed, then they are ready to come in

with their motion, but, yes, we would suggest that.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. REED: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Lehtinen, do you care to respond

any further?

MR. LEHTINEN: Yes, Your Honor, as briefly as I

could, I think that's the strange situation. The

government can actually say we ought to undertake this after

we decide what the existing decree is.

I think it is easy to know what the existing decree

is. It is signed. It is there. It hasn't been changed,

and that's the existing decree. If they want to move to

substitute, which they are obviously going to do, they need

to make that motion at some time.

In the meantime, the breaches we refer to are true

material breaches; failure to do actual things that the

Tribe relied on; failure to begin the research. It clearly

could have been begun. It didn't take an administrative

hearing officer or anything else.

We will argue in the administrative proceedings

that a record that shows in the administrative proceedings

where the judge turns to me and says, "Mr. Lehtinen, you are

the only people who don't want to delay these proceedings.

 


47

 

You are the only persons who want me to try it. The feds

want to delay it. The state wants to delay it. The Water

Management District wants to delay it. How come You are the

only guys who want to go forward?"

We will argue later that that establishs a record

why the administrative proceedings are bogus excuses for not

going forward because those guys are always there telling

the judge, "Don't go forward," but it is even more simple

than that.

It is real things, like the research that was fully

in control of the parties, not the hearing officers. It is

the obligation to begin to enforce the clause that says

pollution from the Western Basin unrelated to EEA pollution.

There will be an arrangement made to deal with that

pollution which is dumped directly on the Miccosukee Tribe.

So Your Honor framed it correctly. We believe that the

Everglades Forever Act that the state legislature cannot

void agreements that the state enters into.

We believe it is that simple, that no citizen of

the State of Florida or anywhere in the world will ever sign

a deal with Florida if they implicitly reserve the right to

break the deal by changing the law.

The state is not permitted to sign a deal, make a

promise, come back and say, "But we tricked you because our

own legislature can void that agreement and substitute for

 


48

 

it."

THE COURT: You raise an interesting point, and it

kind of begs some questions. The deal that you speak of was

between the state government and the federal government, and

they cooperated in the breach as any two contracting parties

have a right to do.

Now, that, of course, implicates your interest in

the litigation. You have become a plaintiff by permission

of the Court, which means in some sense you have become

perhaps it fair to say a party to that contract.

You have not agreed to it, or at least there is a

question, isn't it?

MR. LEHTINEN: Yes, Your Honor. We think they

could, as contracting parties, join together had they not,

under their trust obligation and all the other legal duties

to the indian tribe, had they not clearly and explicitly

induced the Tribe to waive rights and, therefore, gave the

Tribe the standing,

Were it only the Federal Government and the state

subject, of course, to the interests of the farming

communities to whatever standing they had, then they could

jointly come to you and probably convince you to change it,

but it was quite clear that the Tribe gave up substantial

remedies, substantial rights.

They are recited in the M.O.A. as to what they gave

 


49

 

up, and under the trust doctrine the United States

Government owes this duty to them. So, they essentially

gave that up. Of course, that is relevant here. It is

relevant in other litigation, as well, but fundamentally

insofar as the state legislature itself has no authority to

breach agreements that the state has entered into, the EFA

stands for the proposition that we, the Tribe, moved to

enforce the agreement, have standing to do so and then those

parties should come in and say, "For the following reasons

we concurred in the state legislation. We believed that it

was essential," as Mr. Guest said that they will argue as

they did there, that these deadlines have to be put off, and

so forth.

As Mr. Guest said, in many cases we think we can

show that is simply not true. In some cases we would accede

to force ma jeur or necessity in that circumstance, but the

quite clear distinction is between does the EFA, as a matter

of law, come in and supercede, or does Your Honor simply

hold a hearing on our motion to enforce and recognize

certain enforcement factors as you told the hearing?

The implication, and I believe, by the way, and I

will just settle for this comment, so to speak, I believe

that as I phrase it, of course, phrasing it most favorable

to my client, that the legislature cannot breach deals that

the state entered into.

 


50

 

I believe that's why there is, since that is

probably recognized by most parties, I believe that's why

they are trying to enter a back door method of breaching it

with references so that Your Honor's order only started a

process.

Well that's true, but it committed the state to

obtaining certain standards and certain things that it was

to do under those standards, like build this, or do that,

and so forth. It might require administrative action.

THE COURT: It approves a settlement agreement.

MR. LEHTINEN: That's correct.

THE COURT: Which provided a variety of things.

MR. LEHTINEN: And it recognized an administrative

process, but it certainly did not in any sense recognize, or

would it have been signed by anyone had it purported to

recognize a state legislative right to simply void that

agreement and substitute for it.

The real key to that agreement was that if all of

the state administrative processes failed, be it good faith

reasons or bad faith collusive reasons, for whatever reason,

the fact is that the decree made it clear, the settlement

agreement in the Court's order that there were certain

standards that had to be met.

The base standard of the state is no discharge that

causes an imbalance of flora and fauna. The state was to

 


51

use any methods that it had. The primary method that Your

Honor can enforce, if no other method is available, is do

what they do to me or anybody else in this courtroom if I

made a discharge causing an imbalance of flora and fauna.

Red tag my business. Find me in violation. This

whole struggle is by state and federal parties to avoid

enforcing the law of the State of Florida. I may say that

some of us regret joining in that process and agreeing that

if you want to go through a bunch of public works projects

so you don't have to enforce your law, go ahead and try it.

We will accede to it, but if they don't work, you

will enforce your law.

Now, insofar as what they are saying is these

public works projects aren't on schedule, they don't work,

etc, etc, etc, the main law is still there. These

discharges that cause an imbalance of flora and fauna should

not be occurring.

We believe that there is no way the legislature

could change that standard under The Clean Water Act. It

didn't change that standard in The Clean Water Act, or if it

did, it is in violation of The Clean Water Act.

It asserts in another proceeding that it did not

change the no imbalance of flora and fauna standard, so at

this point we would have to word it in the alternative, but

it appears that in other proceedings, it is going to be

 


52

 

established, and clearly it already has been, that that they

did not repeal the imbalance of the flora and fauna in state

law and accordingly, Your Honor should hold these hearings,

recognize the reality as necessary, but not as a matter of

authority of the state legislature; just kick back dates and

grant exemptions and things like this that were not

warranted under the federal or state law.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further, Mr.

Smith, or gentlemen?

MR. SMITH: I would just read this portion of Your

Honor's February, 92 decree. Mr. Lehtinen is talking about

the lawsuit that I just don't recognize.

"The United States has a trust obligation to the

Tribe. They were exercising that trust obligation when they

signed this agreement."

The agreement says it wasn't going to have any

effect unless Your Honor approved it, and Your Honor says it

is not going to have any effect unless it is put into

effect, to the extent it is required to be in the SWIM Plan,

and all these things they are talking about were required to

be in the Swim Plan and were in the SWIM Plan, unless it is

approved, and here is what Your Honor says:

"Indeed, should the state administrative process

result in a finding inconsistent with that contemplated by

the agreement, the state agencies, consonant with their

 


53

 

obligations under the state law, must respect that result.

The agencies are bound, in the sense that if the outcome of

the administrative process precludes them from undertaking

final action consistent with the terms of the agreement, if

the settling parties are unable to agree to a modification

of the agreement, after resort to dispute resolution or upon

a claim of force ma jeur, the United States retains the

right to return to this Court and have the dispute resolved

in a federal forum."

Significantly, the agreement does not dictate how

this dispute must be resolved. The farmers were to have

their say in the administrative process. We either had our

say or we were presumed to have had our say before the

constitutional legislature of the State of Florida.

We are either back here with that as a full and

complete response to Your Honor's decree, or we have

awakened the litigation again with all the questions that

come with it.

We respectfully suggest that the orderly way to

proceed is for Your Honor to instruct the United States to

file a paper saying what obligations from the former

settlement agreement they wish to have ordained by Your

Honor, in addition to the EFA, and then we can brief the

question of whether Your Honor can or should do that and

what kind of process should be engaged to resolve that.

 


54

 

Thank You.

THE COURT: All right, sir. I think we have pretty

well covered it, unless there is something else somebody

else wants to say.

What I am going to do is enter an order with a

briefing schedule. I am going to tell you what the briefing

schedule is going to cover in that order. You will hear

from me I hope no later than Monday. With that, counsel, I

thank you very much for being here. We will be in recess.


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C E R T I F I C A T E

 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA:

 

 

I, Jerald M, Meyers, Official Court Reporter of the

United States District Court, Southern District of Florida,

do hereby certify that the foregoing pages constitute a true

transcript of proceedings had before the said Court, held in

the City of Miami, Florida, in the matter therein stated.

In testimony whereof, I hereunto set my hand on

this 22nd day of May, 1995.

 

 

 

___________________________

JERALD M. MEYERS

Official court reporter

United States District Court

Southern District of Florida.

 

 

 

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