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PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR STAY
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1991
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WESTERN PALM BEACH COUNTY FARM BUREAU, INC.,
ROTH FARMS, INC. and K.W.B. FARMS,
Petitioners,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FLORIDA KEYS CITIZEN COALITION, FLORIDA WILDLIFE FEDERATION,
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, SIERRA CLUB, NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, WILDERNESS SOCIETY, NATIONAL PARKS & CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION, and DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, FLORIDA AUDUBON SOCIETY,
SOUTH FLORIDA WATER 14ANAGEMENT DISTRICT and
TIMER E. POWERS, its Interim Executive Director,
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
and CAROL M. BROWNER, its Secretary,
FLORIDA SUGAR CANE LEAGUE, INC., FLORIDA FRUIT and
VEGETABLE ASSOCIATION, and BEARDSLEY FARMS, INC.
Respondents.
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On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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Including Additional Record on Motion for Stay
For Submission to Circuit Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
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ROBERT P. SMITH
123 South Calhoun Street (32301)
Post Office Box 6526
Tallahassee, Florida 32314
(904) 222-7500
Counsel of Record
for Petitioners
TO THE HONORABLE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT:
Applying to stay the judgment of which review is sought, petitioners show that proceedings now imminent in the district court may otherwise vitiate sovereign lawmaking functions of the State of Florida before this Court can properly consider the Petition for Certiorari. First the court of appeals then the district court on mandate of the appeals court refused to consider petitioners' question of those courts' Article III subject matter jurisdiction. The appeals court refused a stay pending the petition for certiorari (Sta R2), then the district court denied a like motion (Sta R99-119) by order announced October 4, 1991, but not yet received in writing. I/
The Petition was filed August 5, petitioners' Supplemental Brief on September 16, and the United States Brief in Opposition on October 4. Petitioners will reply within 10 days.
1. This action by the United States seeks a federal injunction compelling Florida agencies to promulgate and enforce a vast state regulatory program to be composed not under the discipline of state law, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1974, Ch. 120, Fla. Stat., but by trial and judgment of a United States district judge. The regulatory targets are Farmers in the Everglades Agricultural Area south of Lake Okeechobee whose farming the United States claims discharges phosphorus into state waters in higher concentrations than the numeric limits
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1 Recent proceedings below are evidenced in the annexed partial record, "Sta R which augments appendices in the Petition and in petitioners' Supplemental Brief, "Pet A "Sup A the state agencies ought to set, the United States conceives, under their broad state law mandate to regulate state water usage so not to degrade Outstanding Florida Waters including the federally-owned Everglades National Park and the state-owned, federally-licensed lands known as Loxahatchee Wildlife Refuge.
2. The United States excluded the Farmers from their initial filing and the district court refused them party status by intervention. The court of appeals, holding that the Farmers ought to have been granted intervention, explained as follows, United States v. South Florida Water Management Dist., 922 F.2d 704, 708-709 ( llth Cir. 1991), Pet A 10-11:
If the District Court issues an injunction setting numeric water quality limits, that injunction will of course bind the Water District. The Water District could not deviate from the terms of the District Court's order by its own initiative. The District Court's decision could thus erase the Farm Interests' legally protectable right to participate in the administrative development of the numeric standards that apply under state law (7).
7 Viewed from a different angle, Count I of the Complaint seeks to move a state administrative task development of standards for implementing the broad commands of the SWIM Act - to federal court. If the state is not doing its job and - statutory authority supports federal proceedings, this move is legally proper. The problem is that various groups have the right to participate in the decision in the administrative forum. If their rights of participation are not to be lost, the administrative participants must receive a corresponding right to participate in the judicial proceedings . . . . (Emph. added)
3. On rehearing in the court of appeals, the Farmers by suggestions and motion urged that the court's Opinion had clearly enough raised, but left unanswered, the critical question of jurisdictional legitimacy: whether any text of
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Constitution or statute state or federal, or indeed of any pleaded contract, in fact "supports federal proceedings" and makes "legally proper" "this move" of Florida's governmental process to federal court; and whether absent such authority this can be a justiciable Controversy within the judicial Power.
[As to any candidate text, Questions 2, 3 and 4 of the Petition ask whether it is not so that the Court's "clear statement" standard, in other contexts preventing judicial arrogation of other sovereign powers through the overreaching of authorizing texts, protects the federalist principle here as well, where the United States (its Attorney not its Constitution or Congress) asks a federal judge to capture a state regulatory process, make the state regulators litigate how stringent their rules should be and against whom, then adjudge what regulations are required and enjoin the state to adopt them.]
The Farm Interests may still seek to present their jurisdictional motion to the District Court. If they choose this step, they will be well advised to ask the District Court's permission first. As we have stated, the District Court may condition the Farm Interests' intervention in this case on such terms as will be consistent with the fair, prompt conduct of this litigation. This authority allows the District Court to dispose in summary fashion (as we have done here) of any motions that the Farm Interests may file beyond the scope of their right to participate in these proceedings.
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district court ordered stricken petitioners' suggestion of lack of jurisdiction, and did not read their timely memorandum opposing the United States motion to strike. Pet Suppl Brief, Sup A2-3; Sta R101.
[Question 1 of the Petition asks whether the court of appeals is not indeed bound to decide a jurisdictional question that its Opinion acknowledges and a party then formally raises; or is bound at least not to counsel the district court to evade a question of Article III jurisdiction.]
5. A stay by this Court is now made necessary by imminent proceedings in the district court on a recent United States motion (Sta R72) for an Order (Sta R33) approving and adopting as the court's Order a tendered negotiated Settlement Agreement between the United States and the agency defendants, wherein they "acknowledge that the Court has jurisdiction over this action" and agree (Sta R30) that the court should Order, "The Court has jurisdiction over this action." Sta R33.
6. The proposed Order would require the agencies to adopt a vast regulatory system which the United States says is substantially all the relief it wanted. Sta R84. The Agreement is a 67-page composition (Sta R4-71) of findings of fact, interpretations of Florida statutes and rules, derivations of goals and policies, strategic formulas and processes, monitoring devices, permitting and licensing schemes, quotas for the taking of private lands, and so on. Power to require new regulatory initiatives is reserved to an ad hoc committee of four federal and three state officers who shall answer to the district court.
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7. The proposed Order has as its principal objective the offering at Park entrances, from regulated sources far to the north, the Farmers' farms, requisite quantities of flowing water which has been purified to contain no more than 14 parts per billion of total phosphorus. Map, Pet A53, Sta R12, R36. Fourteen parts per billion is not quite one-seventeenth the phosphorus standard - .24 mg. per liter or 240 parts per billion - that the United States and Florida contracted for as suitable for the Park just four years before this suit was filed. Pet A54, A58. The 1984 Contract is the pleaded source of the United States claim of right in Count III (Pet A47), but the asserted breach is not that the state regulated Farmers less stringently than the 240 ppb contracted for, but less stringently than an unspecified standard the state ought to have promulgated 3/ presumably the selfsame 14 ppb. The court of appeals took note that the agencies recently considered limits of 30 or 50 parts per billion (.03 or .05 ppm), saying they predicted "draconian consequences" to the Farmers. 922 F.2d 704, 709, Pet A13.
8. Petitioners' unsuccessful motion for stay in the district court, Sta R99, submitted an affidavit of Professor L. Harold Levinson of Vanderbilt Law School, a scholar of national
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As the Petition shows (p. 10), the Complaint edits a Contract recital of Congress' wish to contract with Florida (Pet A54) into an explicit open-ended promise by the state, A48 I 53(a), then alleges that promise was breached, 11 54-58. The Petition also shows (p. 7) how the Complaint grossly misquotes an Act of Congress in order to create an apparent federal question. A42, compare 16 USC S 410c. This Court's "clear statement" standard would have arrested these aberrations early on, but the district court let them stand under the casual scrutiny of FRCP 12(b)(6) "failure to state a claim."
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repute and one of the prime drafters of Florida's Administrative Procedure Act of 1974, Ch. 120, Fla. Stat. Sta R107. The affidavit illustrates, using the Settlement Agreement, how the objective of this litigation vitiates authentic governmental processes. Procedurally, such a decision "clearly falls outside the [Florida) APA's framework of decision -making . . . . impairs the ability of DER and the District to perform their proper functions under the APA, and . . . deprives affected persons of the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the decision-making processes of DER and the District" (Sta R113); it interprets Florida law in a forum that "prevents DER and the District from performing their functions, and prevents affected persons from participating meaningfully in the processes of those agencies" (Sta R114); it finds facts that Florida agencies are bound to find instead by authentic APA processes, and "deprives affected persons of their right to participate in the factfinding" (Sta R114); in policymaking the Agreement "encroaches on the exercise of discretion or the formulation of policy" that Florida law commits to its agencies acting in their own forums and according to prescribed disciplines (Sta R115).
9. According to Professor Levinson, Florida's APA is "distinctive" in that "to a greater extent than administrative procedure statutes of most other jurisdictions," including the federal, Florida's law gives affected persons structured opportunities "to change the agency's mind" by evidence, argument, and adverse commentary by independent hearing officers. Sta R110. That discipline extends to an agency's
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interpretations of law, formulation of policy, factfinding, strategic planning, and virtually all reasoning that composes or constitutes the agency's action. Sta R110, R 111, Levinson:
Obviously, an agency is not required to agree with every submission of an affected person, but the agency is required to consider each submission in good faith, so that each affected person has a fair and realistic opportunity to change the agency's mind by the persuasive power of that person's in@u-t into the administrative decision-making process. (E.a.)
10. Hundreds of Florida judicial decisions attest that the APA "subjects every agency action to immediate or potential scrutiny . . . assures notice and opportunity to be heard on virtually every important question before an agency . . . provides independent hearing officers as fact finders in the formulation of particularly sensitive administrative decisions [and) requires written findings and conclusions on impact issues 4/ Because "the APA infuses Section 120.57(l) proceedings with concern for agency policy as well as for facts and law," McDonald v. Dept. of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569, 582, 583 (Fla. lst DCA 1978), its discipline "subjects agency policymakers to the sobering realization their policies lack convincing wisdom, and requires them to cope with the hearing officer's adverse commentary." "Recently," a Florida court wrote in a 1981 decision, 5/ "that most pilloried of all bureaucracies, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, demonstrated its capability to change its mind on an
4 State ex rel. Dept. of General Serv. v. Willis, 344 So.2d 580, 591 (Fla. lst DCA 1977).
5 Key Haven Assoc. Enter., Inc. v. Board of Trustees, etc., 400 So.2d 66, 73 (Fla. lst DCA 1981).
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important question of statutory construction because of evidence and arguments brought forward by APA processes." In an 1985 case, 6/ "Baxter's was given its chance to convince DOT to change its mind. The facts and figures were considered anew providing Baxter's with the de novo hearing mandated by Chapter 120.11 One commentator has noted that Florida's APA grants affected parties a "right to participate directly in government policymaking" to a degree that "would work a revolution in existing government practices" if it were a federal standard quoting Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight,, 465 U.S. 271, 284 (1984). Maher, "We're No Angels: Rulemaking and Judicial Review in Florida," 18 Fla.St.L.Rev. 767, 790 n. 112 (1991).
11. In other words, the "narrative water quality standards," as the court of appeals termed those malleable Florida texts that are the latticework for this adjudication, Pet A7-All, are by Florida law to derive meaning and effect only from the Chapter 120 discipline that Professor Levinson and Florida courts have described. E.2., Ch. 91-80, Fla. Laws 1991, Sec. 373.4592(6), Fla. Stat. 7/ They were enacted and reenacted inseparably from the expectation that that discipline obtains.
6 Baxter's Asphalt and Concrete, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 400 So.2d 66, 73 (Fla. lst DCA 1985).
7 "[T]he final agency action of the governing board of the district under s. 373.456(4) or(5)(b) shall constitute an order of the district . . . subject to the provisions of s. 120.57. If a provision of the plan is to be implemented through permits for which there is no existing rule requirement, the district shall engage in rulemaking procedures pursuant to chapter 120 for the adoption of the requirement."
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12. Gone now from the United State's presentation to the courts below is any pretense of claiming under contract or federal statute. The United States Motion for Approval, etc., recites at Sta R84-85 all the "statutes and regulations the United States seeks in this litigation to enforce." All are Florida law texts, none federal, none contractural. Cf. supra fn. 3. Concerning the effect given those texts by the proposed Order, the United States affects belief that binding the agencies who have final authority in Florida law, as now this coercive litigation has done, "neither binds nor otherwise infringes on the legally protectable rights of third parties -most significantly, the Agricultural Intervenors - such that the Court should withhold its approval." Sta R 85-86. The United States does not explain how one undertakes to change the mind of a decision maker who is bound by a federal judge. Another opaque passage in the Motion exemplifies the triviality of any Chapter 120 process as will remain, ceremoniously, after all of significance has been federally adjudicated. United States Motion for Approval, etc., Sta R88-89 (emph. added):
Although the Agricultural Intervenors' legally protectable interests might have been significantly impaired as the Court of Appeals imagined under various other outcomes to this litigation, the Settlement Agreement does not sidestep state procedures in establishing a process for numerically interpreting existing enforceable narrative nutrient standards. The Settlement Agreement by necessity takes into account that state administrative and judicial proceedings related to the District's and DER's implementation of the Agreement, in which than Agricultural Intervenors are free to participate to the extent Florida law provides, must run their normal course. Settlement Agreement at 19-22, 28 [Sta R22-25, 311. In sum, the Settlement Agreement's effect on third parties "is neither unreasonable nor proscribed." [United States v.] City of Miami, 664 F.2d [4351 at 441 [(5th Cir. 1981)].
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13. "[I]t is inherent in the constitutional plan," this Court held in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 (1934), that Article III grants federal courts power to entertain an action by the United States against one of the states. But this Court in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) described that constitutional plan as two governments "each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other." The matter of this sovereign state regulation, absent any text of law that conceivably grants the United States the right and remedy for which it demands federal adjudication, is among "the objects committed to the other" sovereign, the State of Florida, and is not a Controversy such as can be the subject of a United States suit having the purpose and effect of dictating another sovereign's lawmaking.
We respectfully ask that proceedings below be stayed so that the Court may maturely consider the Petition for Certiorari without endangering further the sovereign interest of Florida in its own government, and petitioners' interest in its access to the lawful processes of that government.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT P. SMITH
123 South Calhoun Street
Post Office Box 6526
Tallahassee, FL 32314
Counsel of record for Petitioners.
October 11, 1991.
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Fred R. Disheroon
Department of Justice
Land & Natural Resources Division
Tenth and Constitution Ave., N.W. Room 7332
Washington, D.C. 20530
Robert Dreher
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund 1531 P Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
Terrell K. Arline
11380 Prosperity Farms Road Suite 204
West Palm Beach, Florida 33410
Steven A. Herman
Department of Justice
Environment & Natural Resources Division
General Litigation Section
P.O. Box 663
Washington, D.C. 20044-0663
John E. Baker, City Attorney
City of Belle Glade
257 Southeast Avenue E
Belle Glade, Florida 33430
John A. Yaun, City Attorney City of Clewiston
P. 0. Box 756
Clewiston, Florida 33440
Martin Cohen
Office of Chief Council
Army Corps of Engineers
20 Massachusette Avenue, N.W.|
Washington, D.C. 20314
Stanley J. Brainerd
Florida Chamber of Commerce
136 South Bronough Street
Tallahassee, FL 32320
Robert L. Barr, Jr.
G. Stephen Parker
Robert B. Baker, Jr.
Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc.
2900 Chamblee-Tucker Road
Building 4
Atlanta, GA 30341
Honorable Kenneth W. Starr
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Tenth and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Room 5143
Washington, D.C. 20530
Deborah H. Wagner
David Maloney
Assistant General Counsel
Executive Office of the Governor
The Capitol
Tallahassee, FL 32399
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ROBERT P. SMITH
123 South Calhoun Street
Post Office Box 6526
Tallahassee, Florida 32314
(904) 222-7500
Counsel of Record
for Petitioners
Including Additional Record on Motion for Stay